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THE PSYCHIC COST OF TAX EVASION
KATHLEEN DELANEY THOMAS*
Abstract: Each year, the government loses hundreds of billions of dollars in
tax revenue due to underreporting by individual taxpayers. According to
standard deterrence theory, policymakers should be able to reduce tax evasion
by increasing tax penalties, raising the audit rate, or some combination of the
two. This Article refers to these strategies as increasing the “monetary cost” of
tax evasion. To date, budgetary limitations and political hurdles have made
these strategies difficult for the government to employ. There is, however, another potential means by which the government can improve tax compliance,
apart from raising the monetary cost of evasion. Empirical evidence shows
that people experience some form of psychological discomfort when they are
dishonest, which may deter them from cheating. This Article proposes employing subtle behavioral interventions that encourage more honest tax reporting by raising the level of psychological discomfort experienced from underreporting. I refer to this approach as increasing the “psychic cost” of tax
evasion. Adopting measures designed to increase the psychic cost of tax evasion, such as making small adjustments to the way that taxpayers fill out their
tax forms, could generate much needed tax revenue. Moreover, these
measures would impose very little administrative expense to the government
as compared to traditional deterrence mechanisms like audits and penalties.
While further empirical research is needed to test how to increase the psychic
cost of tax evasion in the most cost-effective manner, this Article proposes a
roadmap for beginning that process.

INTRODUCTION
There is untold wealth in America—especially at income tax time.
—Anonymous

For many individuals, cheating on one’s taxes is perfectly rational.1
The overall odds of being audited are quite low2 and the penalty for un____________________________________________________________
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derreporting is typically just a fraction of the tax owed. 3 It should come as
no surprise, then, that many taxpayers cheat. But this creates an expensive
problem. Individual tax evasion costs the government over $250 billion in
lost revenue per year, before taking into account revenue lost by corporate
tax shelters or legal tax loopholes. 4 This is troubling in any economy, but is
particularly problematic in light of the current budget deficit.
Why, then, does the government not invest more resources in cracking
down on individual tax evasion? Standard deterrence theory indicates that
tax compliance can be improved by raising the expected monetary cost of
evasion to taxpayers. This expected cost is a simple function of the probability of detection and the fine for evasion: If the government makes it more
likely that an individual will be caught cheating or more expensive if that
individual is caught, then she should be less likely to cheat. For example, a
rational actor would not evade $100 of taxes if she had a fifty percent
chance of incurring a $400 penalty (expected penalty of $200) or a five percent chance of incurring a $4,000 penalty (same).5 Thus, according to deter1
This is particularly true of individuals who generate income not subject to any third-party
reporting, such as a small business owner who earns self-employment income. Underreporting
income that is not reported by third parties (e.g., a bank reporting on a Form 1099 or an employer
reporting on a W-2) can be incredibly difficult for the IRS to detect. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: THE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP
SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR REDUCING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE, REPORT TO THE
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE 12 (2007) [hereinafter “GAO STRATEGY”].
2
On average, the IRS audits about one percent of individuals each year. See IRS, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE FISCAL YEAR 2013 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS 2, available at
http://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/FY%202013%20Enforcement%20and%20Service%20Results
%20--%20WEB.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PG9W-2CCH (noting individual audit rate for
2013 was 0.96%). The chance of being audited, however, varies depending on individual characteristics. For example, individuals who are self-employed and not subject to third-party withholding on their business income have an overall audit rate closer to three percent. See GAO STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 23. Nevertheless, even for individuals that are audited, there is no guarantee
that the IRS will detect unreported income.
3
A typical civil tax penalty for underreporting is twenty percent of the tax due. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(1) (2012) (negligence penalty). The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) also
provides for a seventy-five percent civil fraud penalty, as well as criminal fines and other criminal
sanctions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6663, 7201–7203 (2012). These more serious measures, however,
are rarely applied. For example, in 2013, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) asserted over
700,000 accuracy-related civil penalties (generally twenty percent of the tax owed) against individuals, trusts, and estates, compared to less than 4000 civil fraud penalties. See IRS, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2013, at 42–43 (2013). The number of cases referred for criminal
prosecution by the IRS was just 4364. Id. at 44–45.
4
See Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006, IRS, 2 (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/
overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5D2W-DCGV (estimating that individuals underreported $235 billion in income taxes and $57 billion in self-employment taxes in 2006,
the most recent year studied by the IRS).
5
This example is somewhat oversimplified. For example, it ignores risk aversion, which
many standard deterrence theory models account for. Varying levels of risk aversion would cause
some individuals to behave more cautiously than others even if penalties and audit rates remained
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rence theory, policymakers should be able to reduce tax evasion by raising
the audit rate, increasing tax penalties, or some combination of both.
At first blush, it is puzzling why the government has not employed this
seemingly obvious strategy. The answer, in large part, is because it is not
necessarily cost-effective from the government’s perspective. Audits can
require relatively large amounts of time and financial resources, 6 and raising the audit rate beyond its current level is generally seen as politically
infeasible. Increasing tax penalties imposes more subtle costs, but many
scholars have argued that increasing penalties much beyond their current
levels is cost prohibitive due to both high administrative costs (such as increased litigation) and the potential “crowding out” of voluntary compliance. 7
But there is another cost to tax evasion incurred by taxpayers, which
may provide a more promising means by which the government can improve tax compliance. Apart from the potential monetary costs, individuals
may also experience some form of psychological discomfort when they are
dishonest, which may deter them from cheating. This discomfort—we might
think of it as guilt—imposes an additional utility cost not accounted for by
the standard deterrence model. I refer to this cost as the “psychic cost” of
tax evasion, and argue that it should be factored into our understanding of
the taxpayer’s cost-benefit analysis along with the monetary costs.
The idea that guilt might deter people from cheating is not new. The
tax literature has long recognized that individual ethics play some role in
tax compliance. But past scholarship has portrayed honesty as a fixed personal characteristic, generally assuming that individuals are either inherently honest or dishonest. Recent empirical studies by psychologists and behavioral economists, however, have demonstrated that individual honesty is
actually a malleable trait, influenced heavily by environmental factors. While
a minority of individuals are completely honest in all circumstances (even if
it would be economically advantageous to lie), and a minority of individuals
are dishonest whenever it financially benefits them, most fall somewhere in

constant. See, e.g., Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 124 n.82 (2013).
6
For every tax dollar collected, the IRS estimates that it spends $0.006 on average. Joel
Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1449 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002). Some audits, however, will
inevitably be more costly than others. For example, auditing a taxpayer with a cash-based business
may consume a lot of time and resources because the taxpayer may be unable to provide reliable
or accessible paper documentation of income and expenses.
7
See infra notes 16–37 and accompanying text.
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the middle of the spectrum and may or may not cheat depending on the circumstances. 8
Notably, the level of expected monetary gain derived from cheating is
not the sole factor in the decision to be honest (contrary to what deterrence
theory would predict), nor is it the most influential. Rather, researchers have
identified several non-economic factors that influence the decision to be
honest. 9 First, individuals tend to be more honest when they pay attention to
their own moral standards at the time of decision-making. For example,
subjects who were asked to recall the Ten Commandments before completing a task cheated significantly less at that task than controls, regardless of
how many Commandments they could recall and regardless of their religious beliefs. 10 The results of the study suggest that the mere act of having
to think about the Ten Commandments influenced subjects’ honesty.
Secondly, individuals tend to be less honest when they are able to justify their actions to themselves as something other than cheating (a process
referred to as “categorization”).11 Psychologists have posited that this tendency stems from two competing desires: the desire to obtain economic
benefits from cheating and the desire to maintain one’s self-concept as an
honest person. 12 Because individuals experience discomfort when they act
contrary to their self-concept, they tend not to cheat unless they can convince themselves that what they are doing is not really cheating. For example, people might be more willing to take office supplies from an employer
than to take the equivalent amount of cash (although there is no economic
difference) because they can categorize the former as something other than
stealing.
Third, individuals tend to be more honest when they perceive that there
is a victim who will be directly harmed by their dishonesty. For example,
studies show that subjects cheat less when they are told that their financial
payoff will reduce the payoff to a counterparty, as compared to when there
is no counterparty. 13 However, the unselfish motive diminishes as the wealth

____________________________________________________________
8

See, e.g., Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 391–
92 (2005); Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 633, 642–43 (2008); Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty
in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 117, 117–18
(2006).
9
Although this Article will focus on three factors for which there is a substantial amount of
empirical support, this list of factors that influence honesty is by no means exhaustive.
10
See infra notes 77–98 and accompanying text.
11
See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 634–35.
12
See id. at 634.
13
See Gneezy, supra note 8, at 385.
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of the counterparty increases (e.g., people are more accepting of employees
cheating employers than vice versa).14
This Article applies these three empirical findings to taxpayer behavior
and argues that policymakers should use this evidence regarding individual
honesty to reduce tax evasion. I begin by proposing a simple theoretical
model of tax compliance that supplements the standard deterrence model by
accounting for the psychic cost of tax evasion. I then argue that the three
factors described above should be incorporated into our understanding of
the psychic cost of cheating. For example, paying attention to moral standards should be seen as increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion (resulting
in less cheating) while categorizing dishonest behavior as acceptable should
be seen as decreasing the psychic cost of tax evasion (resulting in more
cheating). The latter half of this Article then focuses on the tax policy implications of this approach.
By understanding the psychic cost of tax evasion as malleable, rather
than a fixed trait of a particular taxpayer, this cost becomes another policy
tool—along with audits and penalties—that can be utilized by the government in an effort to increase tax compliance. In the same way that raising
penalties or increasing the audit rate would make the expected monetary
cost of evasion higher for taxpayers (thus improving compliance), undertaking policies designed to raise the psychic cost of tax evasion could have a
similar impact. The core argument of the Article is that the government
should raise the psychic cost of tax evasion by employing subtle behavioral
“nudges” 15 that encourage taxpayers to be more honest. For example, the
IRS might incorporate brief statements on income tax returns that are designed to call attention to the taxpayer’s moral standards. More honesty in
tax reporting equates to more tax revenue raised. Moreover, adopting
measures to increase the psychic cost of tax evasion should impose a relatively small administrative cost to the government compared to expending
resources to audit more taxpayers, and should avoid the crowding out effects and other costs imposed by high penalties.
This Article makes a unique contribution to the existing tax literature
by identifying the psychic cost of tax evasion as an additional policy tool
that can and should be exploited by the government to improve tax compliance. It then offers realistic tax policy applications for the existing behavioral economics literature on honesty. While further empirical research is
____________________________________________________________
14

It also diminishes as the payoff to the cheating party increases, suggesting that rational
forces still come into play, notwithstanding the presence of a victim. See id. at 391.
15
See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2d. ed. 2009) (coining the term “nudge” to describe
modest behavioral interventions).
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needed to test how to implement behavioral nudges in the most cost-effective
manner, this Article proposes a roadmap for beginning that process.
To be clear, this Article is aimed only at intentional tax evasion by individuals when the relevant law is unambiguous. For example, the behavioral interventions suggested herein would be aimed at a taxpayer who wins
cash income at a casino, is aware that it is reportable, but is contemplating
not reporting it. This Article is not intended to reach taxpayers who employ
legal avoidance strategies or those who take an aggressive but legally defensible position with respect to a murky area of law.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the standard deterrence model of tax compliance, along with some of the existing literature on
non-economic factors that contribute to tax compliance. Part II describes
the results of recent empirical research on honesty, which reveal that honesty tends to be a malleable and context-specific trait in most individuals. Part
III proposes a simple tax compliance model that supplements the standard
deterrence model by incorporating a “psychic cost” to evading taxes and
argues that we must understand this psychic cost as one that varies based on
external factors. Part IV explores the policy implications of a tax compliance model that incorporates a psychic cost of tax evasion. It argues that the
government can and should take steps to increase this psychic cost through
behavioral nudges, and offers concrete policy recommendations for doing
so. It then addresses potential objections to those proposals.
I. ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC THEORIES OF TAX COMPLIANCE
Current tax compliance policies in the U.S. are based, in large part,
upon standard deterrence theory. This Part provides a brief overview of that
theory and examines some additional, non-economic compliance theories
proposed by tax scholars. By asserting that tax evasion should be understood as imposing a psychic cost, this Article does not advocate abandoning
standard deterrence theory, but rather supplementing it with an updated understanding of the non-economic factors that encourage individuals to comply with their tax liability.
A. Standard Deterrence Theory: The Rational Actor Model
Standard deterrence theory, as applied to tax compliance, assumes that
taxpayers are rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility. 16
____________________________________________________________
16

The rational model was famously applied in the legal arena by Gary Becker, who hypothesized that rational actors decide whether to comply with the law by weighting the expected fines
from noncompliance against the expected benefit of noncompliance. Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968). Becker’s work was
subsequently extended to the tax law by Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, whose work has
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Accordingly, a taxpayer who is deciding whether to comply with the tax law
will weigh the expected cost of tax evasion against the cost of complying
and choose the cheaper option. 17 The cost of complying is simply the amount
of tax owed. The cost of evasion, however, is somewhat more complex. If a
taxpayer evades and is caught, she will have to pay the tax owed and will
also have to pay a penalty, which is usually some fraction of the tax owed
(e.g., twenty percent). Together, this penalty added to the tax owed can be
thought of as the total fine for evasion (F). There is a chance, however, that
the IRS will not detect the taxpayer’s evasion, in which case the taxpayer
incurs no cost. Thus, the expected cost of tax evasion is the total fine for
evasion discounted by the probability of detection (P): 18
Cost of Compliance = Tax Owed
v.
Expected Cost of Evasion = P x F19
For example, if the probability of detection were one percent (which is the
current overall audit rate) 20 and the penalty for evasion were twenty percent
of the tax due, the expected cost of evading $100 of tax would be the $100
of tax due plus a $20 penalty (F = $120), discounted by one percent chance
of being detected (P). The resulting $1.20 expected cost would be substantially cheaper than the cost of complying (i.e., the $100 of tax owed). In that
case, a rational taxpayer would cheat.

become the dominant model of tax compliance for both economists and legal scholars. See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB.
ECON. 323, 323–24 (1972).
17
See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 16, at 324.
18
Id. The Allingham-Sandmo model assumes probability of detection p, tax rate r, declared
income of X, and actual income of W. If the taxpayer’s evasion is discovered, she will have to pay
tax on the undeclared amount (W – X) at some penalty rate f, which is higher than r. The individual will choose X so as to maximize utility (U):
E[U ] = (1 – p)U(W – rX) + pU(W – rX – 𝑓(W – X)).

Shlomo Yitzhaki subsequently updated this model by pointing out that the penalty in most systems
is based on the underpayment of tax, not unreported income. See Schlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on
Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 201, 201–02 (1974).
19
This is a simplified version of the Allingham-Sandmo model. See supra note 18. The Allingham-Sandmo model dictates that the expected utility of the evasion decision is the sum of the
expected benefit if not detected plus the expected cost if detected, and both of these are measured
by reference to the taxpayer’s total wealth, W. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Most
versions of the model also assume a risk-averse taxpayer, whereas the above model assumes risk
neutrality for the sake of simplicity and brevity. The Allingham-Sandmo model also simplifies the
true “costs” of tax evasion. For example, there may be additional monetary costs imposed on a
taxpayer besides tax penalties and the tax due, such as the costs of undergoing an audit or hiring a
lawyer.
20
See supra note 2 and accompany text.
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A policymaker seeking to deter a rational taxpayer from evading tax
can do so by raising the expected cost of evasion, with the goal of making it
more expensive than the cost of compliance. It follows from the model that
raising either the probability of detection or the penalty for evasion, or some
combination of the two, can increase the expected cost of evasion. In the
context of tax compliance, this means higher tax penalties, raising the audit
rate, or finding some other method to increase the rate of detection.
At first glance, raising tax penalties appears to be a simple and potentially cost-effective solution for increasing tax compliance. Current civil tax
penalties in the United States range from just twenty percent to seventy-five
percent of the tax due,21 resulting in sub-optimal expected penalties if the
risk of detection is small. 22 If Congress increased nominal penalties significantly, it could potentially deter tax evasion without investing more resources in ferreting out noncompliant taxpayers.
Raising tax penalties, however, presents a number of hurdles. First, at a
one percent rate of detection, optimal penalties would have to be set at more
than ninety-nine times the tax evaded. 23 Such a departure from the current
status quo is likely to be politically infeasible.24 Moreover, costs associated
with significantly increasing nominal penalties counsel against such an approach. Extremely high tax penalties would likely be perceived as unfair in
the case of inadvertent errors, and may be perceived as disproportionate
even in the case of intentional evasion.25 In fact, harsh penalties may actual____________________________________________________________

21
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In reality, the twenty to seventy-five percent penalty rates understate the true amount of the “fine” for noncompliance, because most taxpayers will
likely incur some additional costs such as interest and/or advisor fees if they contest the penalty.
22
In the example in the text above, the expected penalty for evading $100 of tax was just
$1.20 when the risk of detection was one percent and the penalty was twenty percent.
23
See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
1453, 1468 n.77 (2003). To see why this is so, consider again the taxpayer who is considering
evading $100 of tax. For the expected cost of evasion to outweigh the cost of compliance ($100),
the nominal penalty would have to be more than $9900 ([$9900 + $100 (tax owed)] x 0.01 (chance
of detection) = $100).
Most versions of the rational actor model assume some level of risk aversion, which places an
effective ceiling on penalties. See Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S.
Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229, 239
(Wolfgang Schon ed., 2008). For example, although a risk-neutral taxpayer would need to incur a
$9900 penalty to be deterred from evading $100 of tax with a one percent chance of detection, a
risk-averse taxpayer might be sufficiently deterred at a lower penalty. Taxpayers, however, are
generally not thought to be so risk-averse that they would be deterred by current penalty levels
(0.2 to 0.75 of the tax) at a risk of detection of only one percent. See, e.g., Terrance Chorvat, Trust
in Taxation, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 210 (McCaffery & Slemrod eds., 2006); Sanjit
Dhami & Ali l-Nowaihi, Why Do People Pay Taxes? Prospect Theory Versus Expected Utility
Theory, 64 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 171, 172 (2007).
24
See Lederman, supra note 23, at 1466; Thomas, supra note 5, at 124.
25
Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25,
43 (2007).
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ly result in lower tax compliance if they foster resentment in taxpayers and
“crowd out” their intrinsic motivations to comply. 26 Higher tax penalties
may also impose greater administrative costs, as there may be more procedural hurdles before the IRS could assert them, 27 more resources expended
by the government in prosecuting them, 28 and more costs incurred by taxpayers in contesting them. Finally, at a certain level, high penalties will become uncollectible to the extent that they exceed taxpayers’ resources.
Given the obstacles to raising tax penalties, the government might instead focus on increasing the probability of detection, which could be
achieved by increasing the audit rate or the thoroughness of current audits.
But such a strategy would likely face public resentment and political hurdles, as evidenced by the backlash against prior efforts by the IRS to boost
its auditing program. 29 Additionally, many view the IRS’s resources as too
constrained to expand audits significantly. 30
Another method by which the government has increased the rate of detection is through third-party information reporting. The IRS collects information about taxpayers from third parties such as employers and financial
institutions, compiles the data in an internal database, and then electronically matches the data with information that the taxpayers report on their tax
returns. 31 If the IRS finds a discrepancy in the income reported by the taxpayer, the taxpayer may be flagged for audit.32 The vast majority of income
that is reported to the IRS by third parties is also reported accurately by taxpayers on their tax returns (approximately ninety-two percent), 33 which is
consistent with standard deterrence theory. Because the rate of detection for
____________________________________________________________

26
See Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J.
1043, 1044–45 (1997); Alex Raskolikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target
Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 704 (2009).
27
For example, applying a relatively new forty percent strict liability penalty for tax shelters
requires special procedures such as managerial approval. See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012); IRS LB&I
Directive, IRS, Guidance for Examiners and Managers on the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties (Jul. 15, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Guidance-forExaminers-and-Managers-on-the-Codified-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties,
archived at http://perma.cc/Q5NB-83T2.
28
See Slemrod, supra note 25, at 43.
29
The unpopularity of the Taxpayer Measurement Compliance Program (“TCMP”), an intensive series of audits conducted by the IRS for research purposes, is a prime example. The TCMP
was formally abandoned in 1995, due in part to its cost and in part because of the perception that
the audits were overly-intrusive. See Joseph M. Dodge & Jay Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth
Under the Income Tax, 81 IND. L.J. 539, 563 (2006).
30
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-151, TAX GAP: IRS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE REVENUES BY BETTER TARGETING ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES 1 (Dec. 2012).
31
Id. at 4. For example, when a taxpayer receives a Form 1099 from a bank showing interest
income, the IRS also receives the information from the bank.
32
See id.
33
See Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006, supra note 4, at 3 (noting an eight percent noncompliance
rate for amounts subject to substantial information reporting).
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evading taxes on such income is extremely high, the expected cost of evading taxes on that income is also high. Accordingly, if more types of income
could be subject to third-party information reporting, compliance could be
improved. 34 The bulk of underreported income, however, arises out of
transactions for which there are no viable third-parties to report to the IRS,
such as a cash sale between a retailer and a consumer. 35 For these types of
transactions, which make up a substantial portion of the tax gap, 36 the IRS
must find an alternative means to promote better compliance.
The standard deterrence model provides a powerful mechanism by
which the government can improve compliance, namely, by making evasion
more costly for the taxpayer. Although nominal tax penalties have remained
fairly stable over the past several decades,37 policymakers have had great
success in enhancing tax compliance by increasing the rate of detection for
some types of income, largely through third-party information reporting.
Most of the tax gap, however, is attributable to noncompliance among individuals where information reporting is not feasible. Moreover, as discussed
above, increasing penalties or auditing more individuals are not viable solutions to decreasing tax evasion. Thus, to improve tax compliance, policymakers may need to look outside of the standard deterrence model. As will
be discussed in Part IV, adopting behavioral nudges that increase the psychic cost of tax evasion may prove to be an additional method to make evasion more costly to taxpayers while minimizing expense to the government.
B. Non-Economic Theories of Tax Compliance
Although tax compliance policies in the United States are largely modeled on deterrence theory, many tax scholars have argued that non-economic
factors play an additional, important role in tax compliance. A common
thread in this literature is that norms—either social or personal—influence
tax compliance decisions. Social norms relate to taxpayers’ perceptions of
____________________________________________________________
34

See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1759 (2010).
35
See id. at 1752–53; Thomas, supra note 5, at 113.
36
See Thomas, supra note 5, at 113.
37
Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, accuracy penalties ranged from five percent for
negligence to fifty percent for fraud. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 21 (Oct. 1999). Penalties
were strengthened in the 1980s (twenty percent for negligence and seventy-five percent for fraud),
but the rates have remained relatively stable since. See id. at 24, 26–27. The most recent movement in civil penalties has occurred in the realm of tax shelters, where rates have climbed from
twenty percent to forty percent of the tax due over the past two decades. See Kathleen DeLaney
Thomas, The Case Against a Strict Liability Economic Substance Penalty, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
445, 445–47, 449–54 (2011). Although most penalty rates have not increased in recent decades,
there are more penalties in the tax code than in previous years and the IRS collects more revenue
from penalties than it did previously. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra, at 19, 51.
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whether other taxpayers are compliant. Personal norms involve one’s individual sense of right and wrong. This Section discusses the effect of both
social norms and personal norms on tax compliance. 38 Although the two
theories may be interrelated, this Article focuses on personal norms—also
referred to as “taxpayer honesty” herein.
This Article seeks to draw attention to taxpayer honesty because past
legal scholarship has devoted more attention to understanding how social
norms relate to tax compliance,39 with relatively little attention paid to personal norms. While many scholars have recognized that personal norms
play some role in tax compliance, they have been described as a “black
box”—something we cannot understand because we cannot get inside the
heads of taxpayers.40 Thus, research and policy recommendations have tended to focus more on cultivating social norms. Yet, there does not appear to
be a strong empirical case for favoring appeals to social norms over personal norms.
For example, in a recent IRS survey, eighty-six percent of respondents
surveyed cited “personal integrity” as having the greatest amount of influence on their tax compliance decisions, as compared to twenty-two percent
citing belief that their neighbors are honest.41 Additionally, as discussed
____________________________________________________________
38

This is by no means an exhaustive list of factors outside of standard deterrence theory that
may influence tax compliance. For example, some scholars have suggested that taxpayers are
more likely to cheat if they believe that the tax burden is unfairly distributed, that the government
has treated them unfairly, or that other taxpayers are unfairly advantaged. See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 850–51 (1998); Marjorie Kornhauser, A Tax
Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 614–15
(2007); Slemrod, supra note 25, at 39. In a similar vein, others have theorized that compliance is
higher when taxpayers approve of how the government spends their tax dollars. See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra, at 851; Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support
for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 179–81
(2013); Slemrod, supra note 25, at 39. Additionally, taxpayers’ subjective perceptions about the
probability that they will be audited or the fines they will incur may play a role in their compliance
decisions. See Andreoni et al., supra, at 844–46 (discussing studies showing that taxpayers overestimate the probability of audit). Additionally, framing effects (i.e., whether taxpayers are claiming
a refund or owe a balance) have also been found to play a role in tax compliance. See Paul Corcoro & Peter Adelsheim, A Balance Due Before Remittance: The Effect on Reporting Compliance, in
RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE: SELECTED PAPERS GIVEN AT
THE 2010 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE 107, 109 (Martha Eller Gangi & Alan Plumley eds.,
2010).
39
See infra notes 44–55 and accompanying text.
40
Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 137–38
(2009).
41
IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2012 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 14 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter
“TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY”]. Forty percent of respondents reported fear of audit as having a
great amount of influence. Id. Of four factors presented to participants (personal integrity, fear of
audit, third-party reporting, and belief that neighbors are paying), the one that most people indicated had “no influence” on their compliance decisions was belief that neighbors are paying hon-
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below, a number of empirical studies have indicated that appeals to conscience can have a positive impact on tax compliance,42 and that feelings of
moral obligation have more influence on compliance decisions than fear of
social stigma. 43 Further, as discussed in Part II, a growing body of recent
research has shed light on the “black box” of personal norms that can provide useful insight into what drives taxpayer honesty.
1. Social Norms
A number of scholars have posited that tax compliance is partly attributable to social norms. 44 Adherence to social norms generally describes
a desire to reciprocate the good behavior of others45 or to send a positive
signal to others. 46 If there is a social norm of tax compliance, then individuals will be more likely to comply because their neighbors are complying.
Such norms may deter tax evasion if taxpayers perceive a threat of social
stigma from violating the norm. 47
There have been a number of empirical studies of the effect of appeals
to social norms on tax compliance. For example, one frequently cited study
conducted by the Minnesota Department of Revenue examined whether taxpayers would be positively influenced by the knowledge that other individuals are highly compliant.48 To that end, the authors of the study sent a letter
to a group of taxpayers informing them that the vast majority of individuals
estly (thirty-seven percent, compared to two percent saying personal integrity had no influence).
Id.
One limitation of survey studies such as the Taxpayer Attitude Survey, however, is that they
assume that taxpayers give honest or otherwise reliable responses as to what actually drives their
tax compliance decisions. It is possible, for example, that some respondents cite personal integrity
as the most influential factor because they fear doing otherwise would make them appear dishonest. However, the fact that personal integrity has been the most influential factor “by far” in multiple studies of different groups of respondents (the IRS reports annual results from 2005–2012)
indicates that it is likely a significant factor in taxpayers’ compliance decisions. See id. at 6, 14.
42
See, e.g., infra notes 58, 64 and accompanying text.
43
See, e.g., infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
44
See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 38, at 850–52; Doran, supra note 40, at 131; Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 612–17; Lederman, supra note 23, at 1468–69; Slemrod, supra note 25,
at 38–41.
45
See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 81 (2003) (arguing that individuals are more likely to comply if they believe
that other taxpayers are compliant, and vice versa).
46
See Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA L. REV.
1781, 1819 (2000). But cf. Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 367–69 (2002).
47
See Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 215 (1982).
48
See, e.g., STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5, 18 (1996).
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comply with their tax obligations.49 The authors reported a “modest” improvement in tax compliance among taxpayers who received the letter,50
although authors of a subsequent study of the same data concluded that the
impact was not statistically significant.51 In a similar study conducted in
Australia, taxpayers who were informed about high compliance rates were
less likely to overstate non-work related deductions, but there was no effect
on work-related deductions. 52 Another field study conducted in Switzerland
examined the effect of a normative appeal (again, through a letter) on the
timeliness of filing and paying, as opposed to the amount reported.53 That
study found that the normative appeal had no significant effect on the timeliness of taxpayers’ returns or payment. 54
Despite mixed results in the data, the idea that social norms encourage
tax compliance has been a relatively popular theory among tax scholars, a
number of whom have made policy recommendations aimed at cultivating
these norms. 55 Others, however, have expressed skepticism that social norms
affect compliance because tax return information is confidential and generally cannot be observed by others.56 Arguably, individuals cannot respond
to a social norm to comply with their tax liability without the threat of a
social sanction for violating it.57

____________________________________________________________
49

Id. at 5–6. To compare the effect of the normative appeal with the effect of standard deterrence measures, another group of taxpayers received a letter informing them that they were likely
to be audited. Compliance generally improved among this risk-of-audit group. See id. at 2–3, 10–
12.
50
Id. at 25.
51
See Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125, 132 (2001).
52
See Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance: From Theory to Intervention, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 862, 877–78 (2005).
53
Benno Torgler, Moral Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy Strategy? Evidence from a Controlled Field Experiment in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOV. 235, 239 (2004). The letter attempted to
highlight the “closeness” of the local community (by explicitly mentioning the number of residents) and the relationship of trust between the government and the community. Id. at 240–41.
54
Id. at 250.
55
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 45, at 83–84; Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 602; Lederman,
supra note 23, at 1501; Susan Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Foundation Under High Penalty
Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 735–36 (2012).
56
See, e.g., Doran, supra note 40, at 135–37; Kahan, supra note 46, at 378.
57
See, e.g., Doran, supra note 40, at 135–37; Stephen Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax
Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1083 (2003). While federal tax return information is confidential, many states make individual taxpayer noncompliance public in an effort to “shame” such
individuals and promote compliance. See Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse? 62 TAX L. REV. 539, 539–43 (2009).
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2. Personal Norms
In addition to attributing compliant behavior to social norms, scholars
have also recognized that taxpayers are likely driven by an internal motivation to comply, arising out of one’s innate sense of honesty, ethics, or civic
obligation. 58 These intrinsic motivations, sometimes called “personal norms,”
have also been the subject of a number of empirical studies. In one seminal
field experiment, researchers compared the effect of “appeals to conscience”
on a group of taxpayers to the effect of the threat of legal sanctions on another group. 59 Both groups were interviewed during the month prior to the
filing of their returns and asked questions intended to emphasize certain
motives for payment. 60 For example, members of the “sanctions” group were
asked about their opinion regarding the severity of various sanctions for tax
evasion. The “conscience” group was asked questions such as whether citizens have an obligation to the government and whether one should feel
guilty for not paying their taxes. 61 In cooperation with the IRS, the authors
subsequently examined changes in tax compliance among the treated groups
for the year under study by examining tax return information. 62 While both
treated groups demonstrated an improvement in tax compliance, the conscience appeal had a much stronger effect than the threat of sanctions, with
a mean increase in income reported of $804 in the conscience group 63 as
compared to $181 in the sanctions group. 64
Another study surveyed individuals to compare the effects of legal
sanctions, social stigma, and guilt on tax compliance. 65 Participants were
asked about past tax noncompliance and whether they expected to be noncompliant in the future. To gauge the effect of different sources of deterrence, the participants responded to questions regarding their views on the
likelihood of legal sanctions for tax evasion, whether they believed the peo____________________________________________________________
58

See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 38, at 850; Doran, supra note 40, at 132; Michael W.
Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 13, 16 (1986).
59
Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, Appeals to Conscience, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274,
284 (1967).
60
Id. at 285–88.
61
Id. A placebo group was given a basic interview without any “accentuation questions,”
while a fourth group served as an untreated control. Id. at 288.
62
By providing compliance data on a group-wide rather than individual basis, the IRS did not
violate taxpayer confidentiality. Id. at 285.
63
This amount, in 1962 dollars, would be greater today when adjusted for inflation. See id. at
296.
64
Id. at 295. The authors of the study cautioned that “results obtained from the experiment are
not of a magnitude which uniformly produces statistically significant differences.” Id. at 294.
There were approximately ninety taxpayers in each group. See id. at 285.
65
See Grasmick & Scott, supra note 47, at 213–14. Whereas violations of a social norm may
result in perceived stigma, the authors noted that guilt results from a violation of a personal norm.
Id. at 215.
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ple close to them evaded tax, and whether they felt it is “wrong” to evade
taxes. 66 The authors of the study concluded that “[t]he threat of guilt feelings . . . is noticeably greater than the effect of stigma . . . which, in turn, is
greater than the effect of legal punishment . . . .” 67 Another similar survey
study that also examined the impact of guilt (attributable to personal
norms), embarrassment (attributable to social norms), and legal sanctions
on tax compliance found that the effect of guilt was 1.5 times as great as the
effect of legal sanctions, and that there was no significant effect found from
embarrassment. 68
Personal versus social rationales for tax compliance are not necessarily
alternative theories, nor are they likely to be independent of one another.
For example, a taxpayer’s personal norms may be influenced by her perceptions of social norms of tax compliance. 69 Once those perceptions of social
norms have been internalized, however, violations of a taxpayer’s personal
norms are associated with feelings of guilt and/or discomfort from acting
outside of one’s own moral code, which should be distinguished from embarrassment or fear of social stigma. 70 In other words, empirical studies
showing that personal norms influence compliance suggest that taxpayers
may comply with their tax liability simply because they believe it is the right
thing to do. Regardless of whether they believe their neighbors are complying, some taxpayers may choose not to cheat because doing so would be
inconsistent with their belief system. 71 This may be the case even for tax____________________________________________________________
66

Id. at 218.
Id. at 225.
68
Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational
Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 851–52 (1990). The authors of the study used the term “shame” to describe feelings associated with guilt from violating
personal norms, a term which others have attributed to violations of social norms. See id. at 846.
There have been additional studies finding a link between ethical beliefs and tax compliance,
as well. See, e.g., Philip M. J. Reckers et al., The Influence of Ethical Attitudes on Taxpayer Compliance, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 825, 825–26 (1994); Dipanker Ghosh & Terry L. Crain, Ethical Standards, Attitudes Toward Risk, and Intentional Noncompliance: An Experimental Investigation, 14 J.
BUS. ETHICS 353, 353 (1995).
69
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 45, at 81; Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 612; Lederman, supra
note 23, at 1469–70.
70
See, e.g., Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit
Perceptions in Tax Compliance, 49 PUB. FIN. 70, 74–76 (1994) (discussing the difference between
guilt for violating a personal norm versus shame for violating a social norm); Grasmick & Bursik,
supra note 68, at 840–41 (contrasting feelings of guilt from violating personal norms with feelings
of embarrassment from violating social norms).
71
However, research suggests that certain attitudes may “neutralize” taxpayers’ feelings of
guilt from tax evasion. For example, people who believe that the government wastes their tax
dollars may feel less guilt from evading tax than they otherwise would from being dishonest. See
Quint C. Thurman, Craig St. John & Lisa Riggs, Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective
Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving Compliance to Tax Laws? 6 LAW & POL’Y 309, 311
(1984).
67
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payers who perceive that the expected monetary sanction for cheating would
be very low.
II. RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON HONESTY
Psychologists have long recognized that, in addition to responding to
economic incentives, individuals respond to internalized norms of conduct
in making decisions. 72 These personal norms create in individuals a selfconcept that generally guides their actions.73 For example, most people consider themselves to be honest, and acting according to that self-concept
would generally result in honest behavior. 74 Acting contrary to one’s selfconcept, by being dishonest for example, imposes a psychological cost such
as guilt or some other feeling of discomfort.75
In recent years, psychologists have updated our understanding of the
role of self-concept in honest behavior by examining external factors that
tend to result in individuals behaving more or less honestly. Although studies indicate that most people view themselves as honest (i.e., most peoples’
self-concept is that they are honest), studies also indicate that, when given
the opportunity to cheat, most people will cheat by a small amount.76 The
presence of certain non-monetary external factors, however, appears to
make it more difficult for individuals to act contrary to their self-concept,
thus resulting in more honest behavior. Although this is not an exhaustive
discussion of that research, this Part discusses several of those factors.
A. Attention to Moral Standards
One external factor that has been shown to influence honesty is whether, at the time of decision making, an individual is paying attention to her
own ethical standards. If a person is not mindful of such standards, presumably she can more easily act contrary to her self-concept without generating
negative feelings.77 Indeed, studies show that people are more likely to be
dishonest if they are not asked to think about moral standards. On the other
hand, when an individual’s moral standards are specifically called to mind
____________________________________________________________
72

See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 633.
Id. at 634.
74
Id.; see also SHELLEY DUVAL & ROBERT A. WICKLUND, A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE SELF
AWARENESS 82 (1972) (describing the tendency of individuals to “avoid the negative affect generated by [one’s] awareness of a discrepancy between a standard of correctness and the actual
attitude or behavior”).
75
Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 633.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 635. For example, an individual might believe it is wrong to lie, but not think about
his belief and compare it to his behavior at the time a decision is made. Id.
73
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or made salient in some other way at the time of decision-making, individuals tend to be more honest. 78
In one lab study of attention to moral standards, a group of subjects
were asked to recall the Ten Commandments immediately prior to performing a numeric problem-solving exercise, while a control group was asked to
recall ten books they had read in high school. 79 Subjects had a financial incentive to solve as many problems as possible in the allotted time. 80 Within
each of these two groups, an instructor checked the answers of one subgroup of subjects, which gave them virtually no opportunity to cheat.81 Another subgroup of subjects, however, was told to tear up and recycle their
answer sheet and self-report the number of problems solved, giving them a
high opportunity to cheat.82 The authors of the study then compared the average number of problems solved among those who had the opportunity to
cheat and those that did not.
In the subgroups that did not have an opportunity to cheat, the average
number of problems correctly solved was the same whether or not they had
been asked to recall the Ten Commandments. This was expected, since individuals in those groups were presumably honest given their low opportunity to cheat.83 In the subgroups that had an opportunity to cheat, however, the results were different. The subgroup that was asked to recall ten
books from high school claimed to have solved more problems than the
other groups, a likely indicator of cheating. 84 On the other hand, the subgroup asked to recall the Ten Commandments reported the same average
number of problems solved as the groups with no opportunity to cheat, an
indicator of honesty. 85 Notably, it made no difference if the subject could
actually recall all or any of the Ten Commandments.86 It appears that the
mere act of having to think about the Ten Commandments—a proxy for
moral standards—encouraged people to be more honest.
Another similar lab study involved the same problem solving task with
the same no opportunity/high opportunity to cheat conditions. In this study,
rather than recalling the Ten Commandments, subjects were asked to sign
____________________________________________________________
78

See id.
Id. at 635–36. The exercise involved a sheet of twenty matrices made up of three-digit
numbers between one and ten (e.g., 1.65 or 8.23). Subjects were given four minutes to “solve” as
many matrices as possible. To solve a matrix, the subject had to find two numbers in the matrix
that added up to ten. Id.
80
Subjects were told two randomly selected participants would receive $10 per matrix solved.
Id. at 636.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 635.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
The average number recalled was 4.3. Id.
79
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an honor code statement before the task. 87 Additionally, some subjects were
paid fifty cents per correct problem while others were paid $2 per correct
problem. 88 The results were similar to the Ten Commandments experiment.
Subjects who recycled their answer sheets cheated more than those who had
their answers checked, but among those with the opportunity to cheat, the
group that signed the honor code cheated significantly less than the group
that did not. 89 Interestingly, among those in the high opportunity group who
cheated, there was little variation between those who received $2 per problem and those who received fifty cents per problem, suggesting that the
change in economic incentive had virtually no impact.90
The significance of attention to moral standards was further demonstrated through a field study of actual auto insurance consumers.91 The authors of that study examined whether signing one’s name before reporting
information, rather than afterwards, would call attention to moral standards
and induce more honest behavior.92 In cooperation with an auto insurance
company, the authors used a form that asked customers to self-report the
odometer mileage of their car and moved the signature line from the bottom
to the top, so that customers would sign before they reported the number of
miles. 93 Half of the customers received the new form (signature at the top)
and half received the old form (signature at the bottom). 94 A review of
13,488 forms revealed that customers who signed at the top reported
10.25% more miles than those that signed at the bottom, suggesting that
moving the signature line resulted in more honest reporting. 95
The authors of the study reached a similar result in a lab experiment
that also tested the effect of moving a signature line.96 In the study, which
involved solving math puzzles for financial compensation, subjects were
given a tax form to report their earnings (based on the amount of puzzles
solved) and to claim deductions for travel expenses to the laboratory. 97 As
in the insurance study, subjects who signed the top of the tax form before
____________________________________________________________
87

Id. at 636–37.
Id. at 636.
89
Id. at 637.
90
Id.
91
Lisa L. Shu et al., Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest
Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15197, 15198
(2012), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/109/38/15197.full.pdf+html, archived at https://
perma.cc/7KKN-S2QS?type=pdf.
92
Id.
93
Id. Customers have an incentive to underreport the number of miles, because fewer miles
driven means lower insurance premiums. See id.
94
Id.
95
Id. This amounted to an average of 2428 more miles per car.
96
Id. at 15197–98.
97
Id. at 15197.
88
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reporting information cheated significantly less than subjects who signed at
the bottom. 98
B. Ability to Categorize Behavior
At first blush, it may appear to be a paradox that most individuals consider themselves to be honest, 99 yet most people will cheat to some degree
when given the opportunity to do so. 100 This is particularly surprising given
that individuals generally are averse to acting contrary to their self-concept.
Studies reveal, however, that individuals tend to adopt strategies to “categorize” dishonest behavior as something other than cheating. Categorization is
the process by which an individual constructs an internal narrative that allows him to view his behavior as consistent with his self-concept. 101 For
example, if an individual took $1 from a friend’s wallet without asking, he
might tell himself “I am borrowing this and it will all even out eventually”
instead of “I have stolen $1.” Doing so might allow the individual to perform the dishonest act (taking the $1) without incurring any discomfort
from acting contrary to his self-concept.
Some behaviors are more susceptible to categorization than others, and
psychologists have posited that the presence of certain external factors influences the degree of that susceptibility. For example, transactions that involve money tend to be less susceptible to categorization while transactions
that involve some non-monetary medium tend to be more susceptible.102
Consider for example, the difference between taking $10 in office supplies
from one’s place of work versus taking $10 from a petty cash box at work.
____________________________________________________________
98

Id. Unlike the field study of auto insurance customers, the lab environment allowed the
authors to detect actual cheating on the math puzzles by coding the forms with unique identifiers
that were undetectable by the participants. Id. With respect to over-claimed income from the math
puzzles, thirty-seven percent of subjects cheated when they signed at the top compared to seventynine percent when they signed at the bottom. Id. With respect to overstated deductions, those who
signed at the top reported fewer expenses (average of $5.27) compared to those that signed at the
bottom (average of $9.62). Id.
99
Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 638. In one study, subjects were asked to complete a task
where some had the opportunity to cheat and some did not. Id. As in other similar studies, performance on the task with an opportunity to cheat was higher, suggesting subjects were being dishonest. When subjects in both groups were given a personality questionnaire after the task, however, those who had cheated rated their level of honesty and morality just as highly as those who
had not. The results suggest that there are circumstances in which individuals do not “update their
self-concept” despite acting dishonestly. Id. at 638–39.
100
See Mazar & Ariely, supra note 8, at 120. Although many subjects cheat in studies in
which the chance of detection is low or zero, the magnitude of cheating for most subjects is small.
See id.
101
See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 634; cf. Andrew T. Hayashi, Occasionally Libertarian:
Experimental Evidence of Self-Serving Omission Bias, 29 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 711, 712–13
(2013) (finding evidence that individuals select behavioral norms that serve their self-interest).
102
See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 634, 637–38.
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If neither transaction is authorized, then there is no economic difference
between the two. But it is not difficult to imagine that an individual who
would never consider taking the $10 in cash might take the $10 in office
supplies without a second thought. 103 The individual might consider the former to be “stealing,” but might successfully categorize the latter as something other than stealing.
A study of the effect of a non-monetary medium on cheating was conducted using the same problem-solving task as the Ten Commandments
study. 104 The same no opportunity/high opportunity to cheat conditions involving recycled answer sheets and checked answer sheets also applied.105
In this study, some participants were told they would receive fifty cents per
correct answer and some were told they would receive a token for each correct answer, which could be subsequently exchanged for fifty cents. 106 Not
only did participants who had the opportunity to cheat claim to have solved
more problems than those that did not, but the magnitude was even higher
among those who were paid in tokens, suggesting that the presence of the
tokens allowed for “categorization” and induced more dishonest behavior. 107
C. The Presence of a Victim
A third external factor that appears to influence individuals’ willingness to be dishonest is whether the individual perceives that a victim will be
harmed by her dishonesty. For example, an individual might not feel guilty
for telling a lie intended to make someone happy (e.g., “you look nice today”), but might feel guilty for telling a lie that benefits the liar at the expense of the other party (e.g., “there are no cookies left in the cookie jar”). 108
One study examined the willingness of individuals to lie if the monetary payoff from dishonesty directly decreased the payoff to a counterparty. 109 The experiment involved a game with two players, each of whom did
not know the identity of the other. 110 Player 1 had information about potential payout scenarios, while Player 2 did not. This allowed Player 1 to manipulate the outcome by conveying either truthful or untruthful information
____________________________________________________________
103

Cf. id. at 634 (describing how it is easier for a person to steal a ten cent pencil from a
friend than to steal ten cents out of a friend’s wallet).
104
Supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text.
105
Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 638.
106
Id.
107
See id. The authors of the study note that there are other factors that influence categorization, as well, such as the magnitude of dishonesty. See id. at 634–35 (“[I]t may be possible to
‘stretch’ the truth and the bounds of mental representations only up to a certain point . . . .”).
108
See Gneezy, supra note 8, at 385–86.
109
See id. at 385.
110
Id. at 387.

2015]

The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion

637

to Player 2. 111 If Player 1 lied, she would receive a larger payoff and Player
2 would receive a smaller payoff. 112 When the gain for Player 1 for lying was
$1 and the loss to Player 2 was also $1, 36 percent of the subjects lied. 113
But when the gain for lying was $1 and the loss to Player 2 was $10, the
number that lied dropped to seventeen percent, suggesting that subjects
were less willing to lie as the harm to the other party increased. When the
gain to Player 1 for lying was $10 and the loss to Player 2 was $10, fiftytwo percent of subjects lied. 114 This suggests that, although the harm to a
counterpart influences individuals’ willingness to lie, increasing economic
benefits from lying diminish that influence.
In another study, participants were asked to judge a hypothetical scenario in which an individual selling a car chooses not to disclose knowledge
of a faulty oil pump that will cost the buyer $250 to repair when discovered. 115 Seventy percent of the participants responded that the seller’s action
was “unfair” and eighteen percent responded that it was “very unfair.” 116
When the scenario was changed so that the buyer would incur $1000 of
damage (no change in seller’s payoff for selling the car), however, thirtytwo percent responded “unfair” and sixty-six percent responded “very unfair.” 117 The results again suggest that individuals are less comfortable with
dishonesty as the harm to another party increases.
Studies also reveal that individuals’ willingness to lie depends on their
perception of the wealth of the victim. In general, the wealthier the victim,
the more acceptable people think it is to be dishonest. For example, subjects
surveyed thought lying to a lawyer was more acceptable than lying to a law
student. 118 Similarly, subjects considered a lie from an employee (individual) to an employer (bank) to be more acceptable than a lie from the same
employer to the employee. 119

____________________________________________________________
111

Id. at 386. Player 1 had information about an Option A scenario (e.g., $6 to Player 1 and
$5 to Player 2) and an Option B scenario (e.g., $5 to Player 1 and $6 to Player 2). Player 1 communicated a message to Player 2 about which option was more beneficial (e.g., “Option A will
earn you more money than Option B”), which was either truthful or not, and Player 2 ultimately
chose the option with no further information. About eighty percent of Player 2’s followed Player
1’s suggestion. Id. at 387–88, 392.
112
Id. at 387.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 387–88.
115
Id. at 389.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 390.
118
See Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences 32 (Apr. 8, 2002), http://
www.econ.pitt.edu/seminar_docs/uri.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9W7R-3K57?type=pdf.
119
Id. at 30–32.
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III. A NEW THEORY OF THE PSYCHIC COST OF TAX EVASION
Although some legal scholars have recognized that personal norms influence tax compliance, personal norms have received relatively little attention in the tax literature. This Part argues that violating personal norms imposes a psychic cost that should be incorporated into our understanding of a
taxpayer’s cost-benefit analysis when making tax compliance decisions.
Further, the recent empirical work discussed in Part II provides an updated
understanding of the external factors that influence personal norms. While
economists have traditionally assumed that the psychic cost of evading taxes is a constant function that increases as the amount evaded increases,
studies have shown that non-monetary factors also influence this psychic
cost. Accordingly, this Part argues that we should understand the psychic
cost of tax evasion as one that can be increased or decreased based on factors such as attention to moral standards, categorization, and the presence of
a victim.
A. The Role of “Psychic Cost” in the Standard Deterrence Model
This Section introduces an updated model of tax compliance that accounts for the psychic cost of tax evasion. It then discusses the limitations
of the model and the merits of incorporating the concept of psychic costs
into the standard deterrence model.
1. The Model
As discussed above in Part I, standard deterrence theory posits that
taxpayers make compliance decisions by comparing the expected cost of
compliance with the expected cost of evasion. In the traditional model,
these expected costs are monetary, determined by the nominal penalty discounted by the probability of detection. 120 If the monetary cost of noncompliance (i.e., the expected penalty) is higher than the tax saved from noncompliance, then presumably a taxpayer will choose not to evade tax.121
Research shows, however, that taxpayers also incur non-monetary utility costs when they evade tax. The guilt or psychological discomfort a taxpayer may feel from violating her personal norms imposes an additional,
psychic cost of evading taxes. 122 Because studies have demonstrated that
____________________________________________________________
120

text.

121

The model may also account for risk aversion. See supra notes 5, 23 and accompanying

This assumes risk neutrality. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Joseph G. Eisenhauer, Ethical Preferences, Risk Aversion, and Taxpayer Behavior, 37 J. SOCIO-ECON. 45, 48–50 (2008); Joseph G. Eisenhauer et al., Experimental Estimates of
Taxpayer Ethics, 69 REV. SOC. ECON. 29, 33–34 (2011); Erard & Feinstein, supra note 70, at 74–
76; James P.F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion,
122
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this psychic cost influences individual decision-making, it should be viewed
as part of a taxpayer’s overall utility calculus along with expected penalties.
In its simplest form, we can add an additional cost (call it Z where Z represents the psychic cost of evasion) to the basic deterrence model and arrive
at the following cost-benefit comparison for a taxpayer deciding whether to
comply or evade:
Cost of Compliance = Tax Owed
v.
Expected Cost of Evasion = (P x F) + Z 123
It remains the case that when deciding whether to comply or evade, a taxpayer will evaluate the utility she derives from paying the full tax as compared to the utility she derives from evading. Under this modified model,
however, the utility costs of evasion are both the expected penalty she will
incur (the monetary cost), as well as the additional psychic cost imposed from
being dishonest. This means that even in cases where the monetary benefit
of evasion outweighs the expected penalty, taxpayers might choose to comply because the psychic cost is too high. The psychic cost is presumably
incurred regardless of whether the taxpayer’s evasion is detected, and thus
is not discounted by P (the probability of detection).124 On the other hand, a
compliant taxpayer does not incur the psychic cost of dishonesty. 125
2. Defining the Psychic Cost
One challenge presented by the above simplified model is in defining
Z. 126 Those economists who have addressed the possibility of a psychic cost
of tax evasion have traditionally assumed that it is a linear function of the

33 EUR. ECON. REV. 797, 798 (1989); Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 68, at 840; Spicer, supra
note 58, at 17.
123
Where P = the probability of detection and F = the total fine for evasion (tax due + penalty
due). See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The model assumes that the taxpayer incurs a
psychic cost for evasion (Z) regardless of whether she is caught.
124
It is possible, however, that when some taxpayers are caught and penalized for evasion, the
sanctions would effectively “crowd out” guilty feelings. For those taxpayers, the psychic cost of
evasion would only be incurred when tax evasion went undetected and/or was not subject to monetary sanctions.
125
Tax compliance could impose other kinds of psychic costs, however, such as those generated by resentment about having to pay taxes to the government.
126
Another potential oversimplification in the model as presented is that it assumes there is
no interaction between deterrence and the psychic cost of tax evasion. In reality, there could be
such an interaction. For example, individuals might perceive that the IRS’s efforts to promote
honesty by increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion are a result of their inability to detect evasion through audits. The result could be lower deterrence accompanied by a higher psychic cost of
tax evasion (which could offset one another).
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amount of tax evaded.127 Under such a view, evading more tax imposes a
higher psychic cost and evading less tax imposes a lower cost. The standard
presumption has also been that the amount of psychic cost that taxpayers
incur from cheating is heterogeneous across taxpayers, but not within a taxpayer. 128
Heterogeneity across taxpayers is to be expected. Different taxpayers
are bound to have different ethical standards, which may be a product of
any number of factors such as internalization of social norms, attitudes
about fairness or government spending, or religious beliefs. 129 These variations in personal norms likely result in taxpayers incurring varying levels of
psychic cost when they cheat. The traditional assumption in the literature,
however, has generally been that for each individual taxpayer with her unique
set of personal norms, the level of psychic cost she incurs when she evades
her tax liability will vary only based on how much tax she evades. 130
The recent empirical work on honesty, however, calls into doubt this
assumption that the psychic cost of evasion is fixed within an individual and
varies only in response to the amount of tax evaded. As discussed above in
Part II, studies have shown that the presence of certain external factors at
the time of decision-making can influence an individual’s willingness to be
dishonest. These factors have been shown to increase or decrease honesty
without a corresponding increase in monetary incentives or the probability
of detection. 131 Further, the studies indicate that certain of these factors are
____________________________________________________________

127
See, e.g., Eisenhauer, supra note 122, at 49; Gordon, supra note 122, at 798–99. Erard and
Feinstein model the utility of cost of guilt from evading taxes as proportional to the ratio of the
taxpayer’s underpayment (the amount of tax evaded over the amount of tax owed). Erard & Feinstein, supra note 70, at 75–76.
128
See, e.g., Eisenhauer, supra note 122, at 49; Erard & Feinstein, supra note 70, at 71; Gordon, supra note 122, at 801. As is the case with any economic model that assumes a single, rational actor, the assumption of homogeneity is a simplifying one, rather than an intended description
of the real world.
129
See, e.g., Erard & Feinstein, supra note 70, at 76.
130
See supra note 128 and accompanying text. In another work modeling a tax compliance
game with honest and dishonest taxpayers, Erard and Feinstein assume (for purposes of their
model) that at each level of income, there is a fraction of taxpayers that are “inherently” honest.
Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game, 25 J.
ECON. 1, 2–4 (1994).
131
Experiments showing the effect of attention to moral standards demonstrated similar effects when the monetary incentive was constant (e.g., the Ten Commandments Study) and when it
was manipulated (e.g., the Honor Code study). See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 635–37. In the
Honor Code study, there was a substantial change in compliance based upon whether or not subjects signed the honor code, but there was not a significant variation between participants compensated fifty cents per correct problem versus those compensated $2.00. Id. at 636–37.
The experiments described in Part II generally involved two variations of the probability of
detection: high opportunity to cheat (recycled answer sheets) and no opportunity to cheat (answers
checked). Id. at 635–36. However, other studies have shown little change in dishonesty at varying
levels of detection. See id. at 640–41. For example, in one study in which participants answered
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truly “external” in that they appear to be independent of things like social
norms. For example, informing participants in honesty studies about the
average number of problems solved by other participants had no effect on
the number of problems those participants claimed to solve. 132
External factors that encourage honesty can be viewed as raising the
psychic cost of evasion, while those that result in more dishonesty can be
viewed as lowering the psychic cost of evasion. Thus, the psychic cost
should be understood as a cost that increases or decreases depending on the
presence of factors such as attention to moral standards, categorization, or
the presence of a victim. These variations will be discussed further in the
next Section.
3. Why Model the Psychic Cost?
The interactions of the various factors that influence the psychic cost
of tax evasion are likely too complex to express with a simple function.133 Is
there any benefit, then, to incorporating the psychic cost of tax evasion into
a simplified deterrence model? Even if we can’t define Z with precision,
viewing taxpayer dishonesty as imposing a utility “cost” from a cost-benefit
standpoint is still helpful from a policy perspective. While the idea that personal norms play some role in tax compliance is fairly uncontroversial,
those norms may be perceived as too intangible, and their effects too untested, to have appeal to policymakers. In contrast, audits and penalties impose
distinct costs, with which we are familiar and can understand from a tradififty multiple choice questions and were promised ten cents per correct answer, there were four
different conditions representing different levels of detection for cheating. Id. In the first condition
(no opportunity), the experimenter checked the answer sheet. In the second condition (some
chance of detection), the subject graded her own answers but then handed both the test sheet and
the answer sheet (showing the number of correct answers) to the experimenter at the time of payment. In the third condition (lower chance of detection), the subject graded her own answers,
shredded her test sheet, and handed her answer sheet to the experimenter at the time of payment.
In the fourth condition (no chance of detection), the subject graded her own answers, shredded
both the answer and test sheets, and paid herself. Although there was significantly less cheating in
the first condition, the level of cheating in the other three conditions was not significantly different. Id.; see Mazar & Ariely, supra note 8, at 119–20.
132
See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 639–40. The study involved the same matrix task involved in the other honesty studies, in which some answers were checked (no opportunity to
cheat) and some answered sheets were recycled (opportunity to cheat). Additionally, some subjects were correctly informed about the average number of problems correctly solved (4) and some
were given an exaggerated number (8). Although more subjects cheated in the recycle condition
than the answers checked condition, there was no significant variation in cheating between those
told the correct average problems solved and those told the inflated number. The authors concluded that “[t]his finding argues against drive toward achievement, threshold due to external costs, or
norm compliance as alternative explanations for our findings.” Id. at 640.
133
This is further complicated by the fact that the psychic cost likely varies from person to
person.
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tional cost-benefit approach. By viewing dishonesty as imposing another
“cost” that can be incorporated into a cost-benefit analysis, we can situate
honesty-based policy recommendations in a context familiar to policymakers, and provide a frame of reference to evaluate and compare such proposals with current compliance initiatives. 134
Further, and more importantly, by understanding the psychic cost of
tax evasion as malleable, rather than a fixed trait of a particular taxpayer,
this cost becomes another policy tool—along with audits and penalties—
that can be manipulated by the government in an effort to increase compliance. In the same way that raising fines, expanding information reporting,
or increasing the audit rate would make the expected cost of evasion higher
for taxpayers (thus improving compliance), adopting behavioral nudges that
are designed to raise the psychic cost of tax evasion could have a similar
impact. These policy implications are explored further in Part IV.
B. Updating the Model
Because taxpayer honesty may play a role in tax evasion, it is helpful
to reexamine the external factors that influence honesty in this context.
These factors include: drawing attention to moral standards, categorizing
behavior, and the presence of a victim. This Section explores how these
three factors relate to taxpayer behavior and evaluates the effect of the factors on the psychic cost of tax evasion.
1. Attention to Moral Standards and Tax Evasion
As detailed in Part II, a number of empirical studies have demonstrated
that individuals are less likely to cheat if they are paying attention to their
personal norms at the time that they make the decision whether to be honest. In the context of tax compliance, this means that individuals should be
less likely to report inaccurately on their tax returns if their moral standards
are made salient at the time of reporting.
Policies designed to increase attention to moral standards have been
shown to reduce cheating without any change in either the opportunity to
cheat or the financial incentive to cheat. Rather, such policies appear to
have a purely psychological impact on individuals, outside of the standard
____________________________________________________________
134

Cf. On Amir et al., Behavioral Economics, Psychology, and Public Policy, 16 MARKETING
LETTERS 443, 451 (2005) (suggesting the use of behavioral economics to influence policy by
using “the established path from economics to policy—attempting to modify economics to be
more descriptively accurate, and from there influencing policy”); Sarah B. Lawsky, How Tax
Models Work, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1657, 1693 (2012) (contending that economic models cannot provide certainty to tax policy discussions, but noting that they are important because they help refine
ideas and shape arguments that enhance policymakers’ understanding of issues).
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deterrence model of decision-making. Attention to moral standards, then,
can be viewed as increasing the psychic cost of evasion. In the same way
that raising audit rates and penalties would make evasion more expensive
for taxpayers, drawing attention to personal norms appears to make evasion
more expensive from a utility standpoint. In the context of the model, attention to moral standards should be viewed as increasing Z in a taxpayer’s
cost-benefit calculus, where Z represents the psychic cost of tax evasion.
The empirical data indicates that attention to moral standards may
have as strong of an impact on honesty as increasing the risk of detection.
For example, in studies in which subjects performed a problem-solving task
for a cash reward, recall that subjects claimed to solve twice as many problems when they had a high opportunity to cheat as compared to when they
had no opportunity to cheat. 135 This difference suggests that risk of detection clearly plays a significant role in the decision to be honest. When subjects with a high opportunity to cheat signed the honor code, however, they
reported the same number of correctly solved problems as those who had no
opportunity to cheat. 136 In other words, the honor code diminished cheating
to the same degree that having an experimenter check the answer sheets did.
Further, increasing the monetary reward (from $0.50 per correct problem to
$2 per correct problem) for cheating had virtually no impact among subjects
who had signed the honor code, suggesting again that attention to moral
standards increases compliance in a manner that is not accounted for by the
rational model. 137
The notion that there is more cheating in the absence of attention to
moral standards is consistent with the relatively high level of tax evasion
that exists among individuals with a high opportunity to cheat (i.e., those
who are not subject to third-party information reporting), who in the aggregate report only forty-four percent of their income. 138 On a paper version of
Form 1040, the taxpayer signs a statement at the bottom of the form, under
penalties of perjury, verifying that the information is accurate.139 Thus, a
taxpayer presumably will not sign the return until after she has reported her
total taxable income (calculated by reporting gross income and accounting
____________________________________________________________
135

See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 637. Subjects claimed to have solved an average of approximately three matrices in the control condition in which their answers were checked. Subjects
who were allowed to throw away their answer sheets without having them checked claimed to
have solved about six problems on average. Id.
136
Id. The average number of matrices that subjects claimed to have solved in the honor code
condition was approximately three. Id.
137
Id. The average number of matrices solved among honor code subjects was 3.1 when the
reward was $0.50, and 3.0 when the reward was $2. Id.
138
See Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006, supra note 4, at 3.
139
See IRS, Form 1040 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NWZ8-HJSF.
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for various exemptions, deductions, and credits).140 Similarly, nothing in the
Instructions to Form 1040 appears designed to call attention to moral standards before the form is filled out. 141 Additionally, the use of electronic filing
software, signing returns with electronic signatures, and the use of return
preparers may further aid taxpayers in reporting without having to think
about their personal norms.
2. Categorization and Tax Evasion
Whereas attention to moral standards makes individuals less likely to
cheat, categorization—the process by which individuals rationalize dishonesty—leads to more cheating. If individuals do not consider tax evasion to
be “cheating” or “stealing”, then they are not forced to update their selfconcept when they evade, making evasion less costly from a utility standpoint. Thus, categorization effectively decreases the psychic cost of evasion,
potentially diminishing it to zero (or close to zero) when individuals can
completely rid themselves of any psychological discomfort from dishonesty.
In the context of the formal model, categorization should be viewed as reducing Z in a taxpayer’s utility calculus. This is analogous to reducing fines
or penalties, which would similarly make evasion less costly for taxpayers.
Categorization likely plays an important role in the low rate of tax
compliance (less than fifty percent) observed among those taxpayers, such
as individuals with self-employment income, who have a high opportunity
to cheat. For example, studies indicate that individuals do not perceive tax
evasion to be as serious as stealing. One survey study compared attitudes
about tax evasion with attitudes about petty theft, defined as stealing something worth less than $20, and grand theft, defined as stealing something
worth more than $20. 142 In the study, subjects were asked to rank the various forms of deception as “always wrong, usually wrong, sometimes
wrong, seldom wrong, or never wrong.” 143 While the vast majority of people in the study believed that both grand theft (90.2%) and petty theft
(86.2%) are always wrong, significantly fewer people (61.1%) believed that
tax cheating is always wrong. 144 Other studies have yielded similar results.
For example, one survey revealed that individuals ranked tax fraud as less
____________________________________________________________
140

See id.
See IRS, FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
i1040.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DD45-P67U. Page ninety-five of the current instructions
does contain information about penalties for misreporting. It is unlikely, however, that this is intended to serve anything other than informational purposes since it is somewhat buried in over 200
pages of instructions.
142
Grasmick & Scott, supra note 47, at 217–18.
143
Id. at 218.
144
Id. at 221.
141
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serious than embezzlement and bribery and that “the typical taxpayer apparently considers tax evasion only slightly more serious than ‘stealing a
bicycle.’” 145
A simple thought experiment demonstrates categorization in the context of tax evasion with an anecdotally familiar scenario. Consider the following hypothetical:
Peter is a schoolteacher who considers himself to be a morally
upstanding citizen. If he is given too much change at a cash register, he will point out the error and return it, no matter the amount.
He once found $20 in an ATM and returned it to the bank. However, when Peter earns cash from odd jobs on weekends, he never
reports it on his tax return.
Peter might categorize keeping the extra change or the money found at the
ATM as stealing, and simultaneously categorize underreporting his tax liability as something other than stealing. 146 This categorization may occur
even if the dollar amounts to be gained from the various forms of deception
are identical. If he categorizes his behavior in such a manner, Peter would
not be forced to update his self-concept (that he is a morally upstanding
person) and would not experience psychological discomfort from failing to
pay tax on the cash from the odd jobs.
Studies have shown that certain factors, such as the immediacy of a
cash reward versus a substitute such as a token, can influence the likelihood
that an individual will re-categorize dishonest behavior as acceptable. 147 For
Peter, the presence of an immediate cash benefit at the cash register or ATM
might make it harder for him to categorize his actions as honest in those
scenarios. On the other hand, simply reducing his tax bill (instead of receiving immediate cash) might make it easier for Peter to categorize not reporting the income from the odd jobs as acceptable, akin to the experiments
showing that people cheat more when dealing with tokens than with cash.
3. The Presence of a Victim and Tax Evasion
The empirical data discussed above in Part II also reveals that individuals tend to be more honest when they perceive that another individual will
be directly harmed by their dishonesty. 148 Although the influence of a poten____________________________________________________________
145

Young-dahl Song & Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey,
38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 442, 445 (1978). The vast majority of subjects (87.7%), however, said that
they disagreed with the following statement: “[S]ince tax dodging hurts no one but the government, it is not a serious offense.” Id.
146
The example assumes that Peter knows that the income from the odd jobs is reportable.
147
See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
148
See supra notes 109–117 and accompanying text.
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tial victim is not entirely divorced from the economic incentive to cheat,149
individuals appear to incur a psychological cost when their dishonesty inflicts economic harm on another party, which makes them less likely to
cheat even when there is a financial reward for cheating. Thus, a perceived
victim can be viewed as increasing Z, or raising the psychic cost of tax evasion, in the taxpayer’s cost-benefit analysis.
For example, in the thought experiment above, Peter might perceive
that keeping an extra $10 of cash from a store clerk is stealing at the expense of the storeowner. The psychic cost he might incur from feeling that
he harmed the storeowner might outweigh his economic incentive to keep
the $10, causing him to decide to return it. But he might feel that underreporting his tax liability by $10 is essentially a “victimless” crime. Or, he
might feel that the only victim is the government, and that the government
is too wealthy of a victim to alter his behavior. In either case, he would likely incur a lower psychic cost from “stealing” $10 of tax as compared to
keeping the $10 in change from the store.
4. Effect of Honesty Factors on the Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion
The factors discussed above—attention to moral standards, categorization, and the presence of a victim—can be seen as influencing Z, the psychic cost of tax evasion. Although traditional economic analyses of tax evasion tended to view Z as increasing only as the amount of tax evaded increases, an updated understanding of taxpayer behavior indicates that the
variation in Z is more complex. Specifically, attention to moral standards and
the presence of a victim likely increase Z, making evasion more costly and
taxpayers less likely to evade. On the other hand, categorization likely decreases Z, making the psychic cost of evasion lower and resulting in more
evasion. Studies indicate that these factors operate independently from financial incentives to cheat, and, in some cases, can be just as powerful of a
motivator or deterrent. Although the relationship between these factors and
the psychic cost of tax evasion likely cannot be modeled with precision, it is
useful to understand how these factors contribute to compliance or evasion
in the tax context. These relationships are summarized in the table below: 150

____________________________________________________________
149

Individuals display more willingness to cheat at the expense of another as the financial
reward increases. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
150
Supra notes 135–149 and accompanying text.
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IV. TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Given that increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion could be a more
cost-effective approach to improving tax compliance than raising the risk of
detection or the fine for evasion, the next question is how policymakers
might go about raising this cost. The empirical work on dishonesty provides
a broad framework for how external factors influence the psychic cost of
evasion. The more difficult challenge involves translating this high level
knowledge of what influences the psychic cost of dishonesty into realistic
policies designed to improve tax compliance. This Part offers concrete policy applications for increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion, identifies areas for future study, and addresses potential objections to the policy proposals.
A. Policy Proposals
In light of empirical evidence indicating that honesty can be induced
by simple, external measures like signing a form at the top, researchers have
suggested that the IRS move the signature line to the top of individual tax
forms. 151 Yet, while the notion of having individuals sign tax forms at the
top rather than the bottom has garnered media attention, 152 it does not appear that the government has been receptive to the suggestion.153
____________________________________________________________
151

See DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY 47–48 (2012).
See, e.g., Carmen Nobel, An Easy Trick to Mitigate Tax Cheating, FORBES, Apr. 15, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/04/15/an-easy-trick-to-mitigate-tax-formcheating, archived at https://perma.cc/4KSH-DAFK?type=pdf; Dan Ariely, Why We Lie, WALL ST.
J., May 26, 2012, at C2.
153
See ARIELY, supra note 151, at 47–48.
152
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The particular challenge presented by incorporating the findings of behavioral economics studies into tax policy is how to translate measures that
successfully induce honesty in laboratories or field experiments into
measures that will be relevant in the reality of present-day taxpayer behavior. For example, simply moving the signature line on Form 1040 may have
little or no impact on actual taxpayer compliance for a number of reasons.
First, the vast majority of taxpayers electronically file their tax returns (seventy-eight percent in 2011), 154 which does not require a physical signature
at all. Additionally, roughly sixty percent of tax returns are prepared by tax
professionals, 155 which would make it even more difficult to build in a
mechanism at the beginning of the filing process (such as an electronic signature) to bring moral standards to mind. Further, those individuals with the
biggest opportunity to cheat—the self-employed, who demonstrate the
highest levels of evasion—must make estimated tax payments during the
year, and thus have likely already made the decision whether to cheat by the
time they file their year-end tax return on Form 1040.
Although translating the results of empirical studies into feasible policy applications is no easy task, this does not mean the government should
abandon increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion as a policy matter. Raising the cost of tax evasion through other, more traditional means presents
other challenges of potentially equal magnitude. Legal scholars have a role
here to supplement the social science research on dishonesty by helping to
translate principles (such as attention to moral standards) into practice in a
manner that reflects realistic taxpayer practices. With that aim, this Section
offers proposals for behavioral nudges designed to encourage more honest
tax reporting.
1. Attention to Moral Standards on Electronic Forms
Although physically signing a self-prepared Form 1040 may not be
relevant for most taxpayers, the IRS could incorporate similar mindfulness
principles into electronic returns. The goal would be to find an electronic
method of calling moral standards to mind before a taxpayer reported information on an electronic return. For example, a taxpayer could be prompted
to check a box confirming that a short statement has been viewed before she
____________________________________________________________

154
IRS, Top 10 Helpful Features on the IRS Website (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/
uac/Top-10-Helpful-Features-on-the-IRS-Website, archived at http://perma.cc/PEC7-G4SN.
155
See Sandra Block, More Taxpayers Are Preparing Their Taxes on Their Own, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2010-04-14-1Ataxprep14_
CV_N.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/XQ9B-B6QT?type=source (sixty-four percent of tax returns
filed electronically were prepared by professionals in 2010); IRS, IRS Releases the Dirty Dozen
Tax Scams for 2012 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-the-Dirty-Dozen-TaxScams-for-2012, archived at http://perma.cc/F47F-E6SY.
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can proceed to filling out her electronic form. The statement could be a version of the statement on the Form 1040 signature block, 156 or contain a
more concise statement intended to call attention to personal norms against
tax evasion. For example, it might simply read: “Reporting false or incorrect information on a federal tax return, including failing to report income
that you have earned, is illegal.” 157
It may be the case that electronic signatures (or simply checking a box
on a computer screen) may not cause individuals to examine their moral
standards in the same manner that physically signing an identical statement
would, however. Further research would aid our understanding of this potential nuance in behavior, as discussed below. An additional consideration
is whether taxpayers would actually read a simple statement such as that
described in the text above, or whether they would ignore it or become so
familiar with it that the statement no longer triggered actual mindfulness. To
mitigate these potential effects, policymakers could keep the statement as
short as possible, display it prominently and boldly with no surrounding
text, and vary it from year to year. In the alternative, taxpayers might pay
more attention if they are required to read and then type out a short jurat in
order to electronically sign. 158
As another possibility, the IRS could target specific tax items that are
commonly evaded by taxpayers and institute policies to trigger mindfulness
among electronic filers with respect to those particular items. A taxpayer
might have to read a statement and check a box at several points during the
filing process verifying that they do not have certain types of income or tax
to report. For example, one commonly evaded 159 item is paying employment taxes on household employees like babysitters, house cleaners, or yard
maintenance workers. 160 For a taxpayer who is considering not reporting
household employee wages, having to affirmatively indicate that they did
____________________________________________________________
156

The text immediately above the signature line on Form 1040 reads: “Under penalties of
perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and accompanying schedules and statements,
and to the best of my knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete. Declaration of
preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.”
Supra note 141 and accompanying text.
157
Statements that highlight the illegality of tax evasion might also deter taxpayers from
cheating by making the sanctions for noncompliance more salient.
158
Requiring taxpayers to type out a jurat before filling out their tax return is analogous to
requiring witnesses to take an oath before testifying in a judicial proceeding.
159
See IRS Notice 2007-35, 2007-15 I.R.B. 940 (“Common Mistakes on Tax Returns”).
160
For certain household employees, taxpayers may have to pay social security, Medicare, and
federal unemployment taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 3111, 3301 (2012). Whether a household worker constitutes a taxable “employee” or an independent contractor depends on a number of factors including,
but not limited to, the amount paid for the services, the period of time spent working during the year,
and the amount of control the employer has over the worker’s services. See IRS Publ’n 926, Household Employer’s Tax Guide, 2–3 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p926/ar02.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/5CDV-2DJ3.
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not have an eligible household employee might impose a higher psychic
cost than simply omitting the tax liability from their return. Alternatively,
having to read a statement about the potential penalties that could be imposed for failing to report taxes on household employees might similarly
raise the psychic cost of evading such taxes. Presumably, reminding taxpayers of penalties for cheating would make their personal norms of compliance more salient. 161
For taxpayers filing electronically directly with the IRS, the IRS could
easily institute such measures. For taxpayers self-preparing with return preparation software, such as TurboTax, the IRS would have to encourage or
somehow require the software companies to include the relevant statements
as part of the filing process on the software. One method of inducement
might include requiring software companies to present the statements in the
software (before any information is filled in) as a condition of the government accepting electronic filing from those companies.162
2. Taxpayer Surveys
Researchers have had success inducing honesty through a number of
different mechanisms designed to call attention to moral standards, from
signing forms at the top, to signing honor codes, to the simple act of having
to recall the Ten Commandments. With this breadth of approaches in mind,
tax policymakers might also seek to make taxpayers’ moral standards salient through mechanisms other than electronic signatures, checking boxes to
“agree” to online statements, or typing out a jurat.
For example, the IRS might ask taxpayers to fill out a brief survey before they file an electronic tax return. The survey could be designed to call
attention to taxpayers’ ethical attitudes about tax evasion. Or, the survey
could make salient to taxpayers the fact that tax evasion is not a “victimless” crime. Calling to mind a potential victim of tax evasion should also
increase the cost of such evasion, in the same manner that calling attention
to moral standards would.

____________________________________________________________

161
Making the monetary sanctions salient might also serve as a deterrent independent of calling attention to the taxpayer’s moral standards. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
162
Tax return preparers would continue to present a challenge. The government could choose
to focus solely on taxpayers who are currently self-preparers (a significant portion of taxpayers).
Or, it might institute policies to further encourage self-preparation (for example, by extending free
software services to a larger number of taxpayers). Another possibility would be to require tax
return preparers to have their clients sign a statement affirming the truth of the information they
are providing at the time they turn over their records to the preparer.
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To complete the survey, taxpayers might be asked to rate the degree to
which they disagree or agree with brief statements 163 such as: (i) “it is morally wrong to underreport one’s tax liability, no matter how small the amount,”
(ii) “it is a crime to underreport one’s tax liability, no matter how small the
amount,” or (iii) “tax evasion results in honest taxpayers having to pay
higher taxes.”
To induce taxpayers to fill out the survey immediately before they file
their tax return, the IRS might offer free e-filing software to taxpayers who
complete the survey. 164 Alternatively, the IRS might offer a few dollars of
tax credit (applied against the taxpayer’s balance due or added to the taxpayer’s refund) for any taxpayer who fills out the survey. Additionally, the
IRS could induce software companies such as TurboTax to include the survey at the beginning of the software program by making it a condition of
accepting electronic filing. Finally, the survey could be included along with
paper returns to be filled out by hand and mailed in with the completed return.
3. Targeting Self-Employed Taxpayers
In considering policies designed to increase the psychic cost of tax
evasion, policymakers would be well-advised to focus on the group of taxpayers with the highest rate of noncompliance: the self-employed. Selfemployed individuals earn income that is generally not subject to thirdparty withholding or information reporting and, as a group, are estimated to
report less than half of their tax liability to the IRS. 165 Income earned by
cash-based businesses is particularly easy to conceal from the IRS. 166 The

____________________________________________________________

163
The format could be modeled after the Taxpayer Attitude Survey, which asks taxpayers to
indicate whether they “Completely Agree”; “Mostly Agree”; “Mostly Disagree”; or “Completely
Disagree” with a number of statements. See TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY, supra note 41, at 13.
164
Currently, all taxpayers can file their return electronically with the IRS free of charge, but
only taxpayers with adjusted gross income under $60,000 can also access free software to help them
prepare their returns. See IRS, Free File: Do Your Taxes for Free (last visited Feb. 22, 2015),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Free-File:-Do-Your-Federal-Taxes-for-Free, archived at http://perma.cc/
VNL5-4HPZ. The IRS might waive the adjusted gross income ceiling for any taxpayer who fills out
the survey. Although this may require the government to compensate the software companies that
offer the filing software (e.g., TurboTax), the cost could be offset by compliance gains resulting
from the survey. A more cost-effective solution might be for the federal government to develop its
own tax preparation software that it could provide for free to taxpayers. This would give the IRS a
significant degree of control over compliance mechanisms like taxpayer surveys that are designed
to induce honesty.
165
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
166
See Thomas, supra note 5, at 115 n.32.
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IRS estimates that failure to report self-employment income costs the government $179 billion in unpaid tax each year.167
Unlike employees whose taxes are withheld by employers, self-employed taxpayers generally must submit quarterly estimated tax payments to
the IRS during the year or face a penalty. 168 To avoid the penalty, the estimated payments must total ninety percent of the current year’s tax liability
(four payments of 22.5%) or one hundred percent of the previous year’s
liability (four payments of 25%). 169 Presumably, self-employed taxpayers
who intend to underreport their business income to the IRS take this intention into account when they make their estimated tax payments and underreport on those payments accordingly. 170
For example, a storeowner who expects to owe $100,000 of tax for a
particular year could make estimated tax payments totaling $90,000 (ninety
percent of $100,000) during the year to avoid an estimated tax penalty. But
if the storeowner plans to report only $50,000 of his $100,000 in tax liability, then he would likely make estimated tax payments totaling just $45,000
(ninety percent of $50,000).
Suppose now that our storeowner was exposed to one of the abovedescribed mindfulness policies. For example, suppose the storeowner paid
$45,000 of estimated tax during the year, and then when he self-prepared
his Form 1040 in April, he was required to fill out a short survey inquiring
about his attitudes regarding tax evasion. It is possible that the survey
would make the psychic cost of underreporting his business income significantly higher, but it is also likely that the storeowner feels pre-committed to
the tax evasion he has already engaged in during the estimated tax process.
The storeowner has paid estimated taxes on only $50,000 of tax liability
($45,000 in estimated tax representing ninety percent of $50,000), yet he
has actually incurred $100,000 of tax liability. To report such a high number
on his Form 1040 would be a drastic departure from his behavior during the
year and would subject him to estimated tax penalties for failing to report
____________________________________________________________

167
IRS, Tax Gap “Map” (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_
map_2006.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/R2QJ-HR2Z?type=pdf ($122 billion of unpaid tax on
individual business income and $57 billion of unpaid self-employment tax).
168
See generally I.R.C. § 6654 (2012) (providing that estimated tax payments are due on
April 15, June 15, September 15, and January 15).
169
I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1). The ninety percent threshold is increased to 110% for taxpayers with
net income over $150,000 in the prior year. Id.
170
It may be the case that estimated taxes, by their very nature, contribute to tax evasion because they allow taxpayers to more easily categorize underreporting at the time of the estimated
tax payment as something other than cheating. For example, a taxpayer might tell herself that she
is not cheating at the time of the quarterly payment because she can make it up later by fully reporting at the end of the year. When the end of the year comes, however, that same taxpayer likely
will not want to make up for any underreporting during the year because doing so may subject her
to an estimated tax penalty.
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more income during the year. It would seem, in this example, that the policies to induce honesty came into the picture too late for this taxpayer.
To avoid this problem, policymakers should focus on inducing honesty
at the time that self-employed taxpayers are likely to make a meaningful
decision about whether to be honest—when making estimated tax payments—rather than at the time of filing the year-end tax return. Currently,
taxpayers who owe estimated taxes are required only to submit payments on
a quarterly basis, either through the mail, by phone, or electronically, and
are not required to submit and sign a form until they file their annual tax
return on Form 1040. For example, taxpayers who mail in their estimated
tax payments are instructed to fill out and return an estimated payment
voucher, which requires identifying information but does not require a signature. 171 Taxpayers can also forgo completing estimated payment vouchers
by paying their estimated taxes online using the Electronic Federal Tax
Payment System. 172 Accordingly, the IRS would likely have to alter the current system to incorporate mindfulness or other honesty-inducing policies
into process of paying estimated taxes.
The IRS could incorporate many of the above-described policies into
the estimated tax process. Taxpayers could be required to sign a statement
on an estimated tax voucher verifying that the submitted amount is an honest and good faith estimate of the taxpayer’s income. Or, for those paying
electronically, they could be required to electronically sign a statement or
type out a jurat, check boxes verifying accuracy, read statements about tax
evasion, or fill out a brief survey along the lines suggested above. By calling attention to taxpayers’ moral standards, the presence of a victim of tax
evasion, or both at the time of the estimated tax payments, policymakers
may be able to raise the psychic cost of tax evasion at the most meaningful
time for self-employed taxpayers. 173

____________________________________________________________

171
See IRS Form 1040-ES, Estimated Tax For Individuals (2013), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040es.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V8S5-QVFV.
172
See EFTPS (Electronic Federal Tax Payment System) website, at https://www.eftps.gov/
eftps/, archived at https://perma.cc/NF9W-24P6?type=image (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). A taxpayer can also avoid filling out a payment voucher by paying estimated taxes over the phone. See
IRS Form 1040-ES, supra note 171.
173
Such policies likely would be most effective as new taxpayers enter the system, rather than
at targeting established self-employed individuals who have a long history of underreporting significant amounts of income. For the latter group, even if honest-inducing policies did increase the
psychic cost of evasion, entrenched behavior might be difficult to change. For example, a rational
small business owner with a history of evasion might think that suddenly reporting higher amounts
of income would attract an IRS audit.
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4. Focus on Tax Return Preparers
Undoubtedly, some taxpayers would be unaffected by the policies described above because they turn to a tax professional to prepare and file
their tax returns. Given that tax professionals prepare more than half of tax
returns, 174 efforts should be made to induce honesty among return preparers.
The credentials and training of professional tax return preparers vary.
Some are certified public accountants (CPAs) or lawyers. Others may be enrolled agents 175 or registered tax return preparers,176 individuals who are neither lawyers nor CPAs but who have passed a competency exam that allows
them to practice before the IRS. Regardless of credentials, all individuals
who prepare tax returns for compensation must register with the IRS and
obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number, 177 and all such individuals are
subject to ethical guidelines under what is known as “Circular 230.”
Circular 230 is a set of Treasury regulations that govern many aspects of
professional tax practice, including return preparation.178 Among other guidelines, Circular 230 provides ethical standards and duties for tax return preparers. For example, if a tax return preparer has knowledge that a client has
omitted income from a tax return, the preparer must advise the client of the
legal consequences of the omission. 179 A preparer also must exercise due diligence as to the accuracy of the tax returns that she prepares.180 Failure to
comply with Circular 230 may result in censure, suspension, or disbarment. 181
____________________________________________________________
174

See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
Enrolled agents must either pass a three-part exam or have prior experience as an employee of the IRS. They must also complete 72 hours of continuing education every three years. Like
CPAs, enrolled agents can represent taxpayers in certain disputes with the IRS, such as during the
course of an audit. See IRS, Enrolled Agent Information, http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/
Enrolled-Agents/Enrolled-Agent-Information, archived at http://perma.cc/5Q7H-UZUR (last visited
Feb. 21, 2015).
176
Registered return preparers must also pass a competency exam, but their rights to give
advice or represent individuals beyond the preparation of a tax return are narrower than those of
enrolled agents. See IRS Publ’n 947, Practice Before the IRS, 3 (May 2012), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p947.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9NUV-V6JS. This is not an exhaustive list of lay individuals who are authorized to practice before the IRS. Other permissible
categories include enrolled actuaries, students under supervision, and unenrolled agents. See id.
177
See IRS, PTIN Requirements for Tax Return Preparers, http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Profession
als/PTIN-Requirements-for-Tax-Return-Preparers, archived at http://perma.cc/5PAU-6JEP (last
visited Feb. 21, 2015).
178
31 C.F.R. § 10 (2014). Circular 230 covers, among other individuals, attorneys, CPAs,
enrolled agents, and registered tax return preparers. Id. §§ 10.0, 10.3.
179
See id. § 10.21.
180
See id. § 10.22.
181
See id. § 10.50. Tax return preparers also subject themselves to potential civil penalties
and criminal sanctions for signing returns that they know to be false or fraudulent. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 6694 (2012) (civil penalty for understatement of taxpayer’s tax liability by return preparer); id.
§ 7206 (criminal sanctions for preparation of a false or fraudulent return).
175

2015]

The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion

655

Despite the fact that tax return preparers are subject to ethical standards, some preparers likely play a role, whether active or passive, in tax
evasion among taxpayers. For example, one field study of tax evasion
among cash businesses found that many return preparers had implicit understandings with their clients about unreported cash income and adopted a
“don’t ask don’t tell” approach. 182 Other preparers in the study played a
more active role in their client’s tax evasion, for example, by helping to
prepare a false set of books to back up what was reported on the taxpayer’s
return. 183 While many tax return preparers are honest, it is worthwhile to
consider policies that would seek to induce honesty among less honest tax
professionals.
As one possibility, the Treasury and the IRS could subject tax professionals who are otherwise governed by Circular 230 to an honor code.
Many universities, for example, employ honor codes to reduce cheating
among students when they take examinations. As discussed above, studies
have indicated that signing an honor code immediately before performing a
task with a very low risk of detection for cheating reduces cheating to the
same level as when subjects were exposed to a very high risk of detection. 184 In other words, honor codes have been shown to be a very effective
method of reducing cheating when there is a high opportunity to cheat by
raising the psychic cost.
In a similar manner, if tax return preparers were required to sign an
honor code in connection with each tax return that they prepared, the psychic cost of dishonest reporting 185 might be higher, resulting in more accurate returns. The statement of the honor code could be brief and should not
be a cumbersome addition to certifying preparation of a client’s tax return.
The honor code statement might be a short summary of the ethical standards
under Circular 230, a brief reminder of the potential sanctions for preparing
a false or fraudulent return, or both. To mitigate desensitization that might
occur after signing the honor code numerous times, the IRS might vary its
contents from year-to-year and keep it brief. 186
____________________________________________________________
182

See Susan Cleary Morse et al., Closing the Tax Gap: Cash Business and Tax Evasion, 20
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 43, 59–60 (2009).
183
See id. at 60–61. The study generally involved prepares with a substantial cash business
clientele.
184
See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
185
This would be aimed at preparers who have knowledge of, or having willingly turned a
blind eye to, their clients’ dishonest reporting.
186
Some degree of desensitization to an honor code or a similar mechanism is likely inevitable, among both tax return preparers and taxpayers. Another useful area of further empirical study
would be how the effects of honesty-inducing policies, like calling attention to moral standards,
persist over time.
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Another, even simpler approach would be to simply move the current
tax return preparer signature line to the top of the tax form, as suggested for
taxpayers above. Currently, a paid tax return preparer must sign the bottom
of Form 1040, directly underneath the taxpayer’s signature. Moving the
signature line to the top could call attention to moral standards and positively influence tax return preparers in the same way it could influence taxpayers.
5. Creating a Salient “Victim” of Tax Evasion
As discussed above in Part II, empirical studies have demonstrated that
the psychic cost of dishonesty increases when individuals perceive that a
victim will suffer economic harm as a result of their dishonesty. 187 Indeed,
one factor that may strongly contribute to tax evasion is the fact that individuals may view it as a victimless crime, thus allowing them to incur a
lower psychic cost when they cheat on their taxes. To counteract this effect,
policymakers should strive to make salient to taxpayers that tax evasion is
not, in fact, a victimless crime. By identifying specific economic harms imposed on individuals as a result of tax noncompliance, policymakers may be
able to raise the psychic cost of tax evasion and reduce cheating.
Who are the “victims” of tax evasion? With the exception of certain
excise taxes, 188 most federal taxes collected from individuals are not designated for specific purposes and go to the general revenue fund. In the
broadest sense, any person who benefits from government spending is potentially deprived when there is a shortfall in tax revenue collected. Additionally, anyone who pays taxes is likely subject to a higher nominal tax rate
to compensate for the tax gap. 189 This breadth of potential victims is beneficial to policymakers because they can choose to focus on any number of
government spending programs in identifying specific economic harm resulting from tax evasion.
Policymakers should start, then, by identifying government programs
that have the broadest public support. For example, data shows that the majority of Americans oppose cuts to federal spending on education, jobs programs, and food stamps (among other areas). 190 Policymakers could then
____________________________________________________________
187

See supra notes 109–117 and accompanying text.
For example, revenues from the federal gasoline tax are dedicated to the Highway Trust
Fund. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, JCX-2-13R, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2013, at 18 (Jan. 8, 2013).
189
This would not necessarily be the case if the government used all of the additional revenue
raised from increased tax compliance to increase spending, rather than lower taxes.
190
See Harris Interactive, Cutting Government Spending May Be Popular but There Is Little
Appetite for Cutting Specific Government Programs (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.harrisinteractive.
com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/1508/articleId/693/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.
188
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identify specific cuts that have been made to popular programs within these
areas, for example, a popular education program benefitting school children
that has been cut due to lack of funding. By focusing on discrete and sympathetic groups that could benefit from increased tax revenue, policymakers
can hone in on a more visible “victim” of tax evasion.
In addition to identifying victims of tax evasion, policymakers must be
able to make potential tax evaders aware of such victims, which could be
accomplished in several ways. For example, the IRS might run a media
campaign, akin to public service announcements, via television or the Internet. 191 A brief advertisement might focus on a real locality that experienced
a cut to an educational program, feature affected families and teachers, and
present a message that every dollar of unreported income tax takes away
funding from programs like the one featured. 192 In addition to television, the
IRS might display the advertisement on its website and on websites that
provide tax preparation software, so that taxpayers will view them when
preparing their tax returns. 193
The IRS could also combine messages intended to highlight victims of
tax evasion with messages intended to call attention to moral standards, as
discussed above. For example, taxpayers might have to read statements or
take surveys in connection with filing their tax return that point out particular programs that are affected by revenue shortfalls. The statements should
point out that tax evasion directly impacts such revenue shortfalls. For example, a statement might read:

aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/2U45-HKYB (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (cited in Listokin &
Schizer, supra note 38, at 200) (arguing that policymakers should link taxes with popular government programs to encourage compliance). In contrast, a majority of Americans support cuts in
federal spending on foreign economic aid, foreign military aid, and space programs. See Harris
Interactive, supra.
191
Other scholars have also advocated the use of media campaigns to improve tax compliance. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 634–36 (recommending, among other strategies,
media campaigns to improve taxpayer morale); Susan Morse, Using Salience and Influence to
Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 504–07 (2009) (suggesting focusing on public
goods provided by taxes as a means of fostering social norms of tax compliance).
192
For example, the news media has covered recent cuts to popular programs like Head Start,
which provides education and nutrition services to low-income children. See Christin Nance Lazerus, Federal Budget Cuts Mean Reductions in Local Head Start Programs, POST TRIB. (Sept. 20,
2013), available at http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/porter/22624656-418/federal-budget-cutsmean-reductions-in-local-head-start-programs.html, archived at https://perma.cc/VA69-B85J?type=
pdf. The message would have to be sufficiently broad so as not to mislead the public into thinking
that specific tax dollars were set aside for the featured program.
193
The IRS has relied on publicity to encourage compliance in other contexts. See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized? 30 VA. TAX REV. 1, 2–5
(2010) (providing evidence of a significant increase in IRS press releases regarding enforcement
activities in early April, presumably geared towards tax-filing season).

658

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 56:617

In 2013, funding was cut to a number of Head Start Programs
across the country due to revenue shortfalls in the federal budget,
resulting in hundreds of thousands 194 of low-income children failing to receive access to essential educational and nutritional support. Every dollar of tax that goes unreported by U.S. taxpayers
directly harms government programs like Head Start.
By focusing taxpayers’ attention on individuals who would be harmed by
tax evasion, such policies could make the psychic cost of cheating higher
and deter noncompliance.
A potential limitation of this approach is that it would require a critical
mass of taxpayers to support the government programs highlighted. As discussed above, there is evidence that some government programs enjoy
abundant popular support. 195 For some taxpayers, however, messages about
government spending to benefit any needy group may have no effect on
their compliance decisions. Or, worse, such messages could breed resentment in taxpayers who generally do not support tax funding of social programs, which could encourage even lower tax compliance. Such an effect
could offset compliance benefits obtained from those who were positively
influenced by the messages. Further, as an empirical matter, it might be difficult to determine which government spending programs would be reinstated and which would continue to be defunded in the event that more tax
revenue was generated by higher tax compliance. Taxpayers might thus view
the suggested link between tax compliance and highlighted victims as too
attenuated or even misleading.
This is a delicate area where a particularly thorough amount of empirical testing would need to be undertaken to determine if the compliance benefits obtained outweighed any potential compliance costs. Policymakers
might also have better success in portraying potential victims of tax compliance in a less political way. For example, the IRS might simply highlight
that tax evasion causes honest taxpayers to pay more taxes. 196
B. Directions for Future Research
To successfully raise tax compliance by increasing the psychic cost of
tax evasion, further study remains to determine which behavioral nudges
would be most effective in the tax compliance context and whether they
could be implemented in a cost-effective manner. This Section discusses potential policies that could be tested both in laboratory settings and through
____________________________________________________________

194
This total is hypothetical—a reliable estimate presumably could be determined by the
government.
195
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
196
But see supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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small-scale field studies of actual taxpayers. Such studies could be conducted at the federal level by the IRS, but could also be conducted by states or
localities. This Section also describes the success of other countries, such as
the United Kingdom and Denmark, in implementing the findings of behavioral economics into government policies involving taxation.
1. Laboratory Studies
First, substantively, the application of (1) attention to moral standards,
(2) categorization, and (3) the presence of a victim to tax compliance merits
further research. With the exception of one study of the effect of physically
signing a form at the top on tax reporting, 197 most of the above-described
empirical work on honesty has involved contexts other than tax compliance.
Similar lab studies could be designed to determine whether results from
studies involving cheating on various tasks could be replicated in studies
involving reporting income on a tax return. For example, lab studies on categorization have demonstrated that subjects cheat more on problem-solving
tasks when they are rewarded with tokens (that can be redeemed for cash)
as opposed to cash. 198 Researchers could design a similar cash/token study
that instead involved tax reporting. For example, subjects could claim various deductions (e.g., for their travel expenses) that would increase or decrease the amount of tax refund they are rewarded. The results could be
compared among subjects who are paid an immediate cash refund versus
those who are paid in tokens exchangeable at a later time for cash. A finding
that tokens led to more cheating might aid in our understanding of the role
categorization plays in tax compliance currently.
Of equal importance is further research on the efficacy of honestyinducing policies in settings that reflect real world taxpayer behavior. More
study is particularly merited with respect to potential differences in compliance among paper filers and electronic filers. For example, rather than
simply testing whether a physical signature at the top of a tax return would
increase tax compliance, studies should also focus on whether electronic
signatures or checking a box next to an “I agree” statement before electronically preparing a tax return have the same honesty-inducing effect. Studies
where subjects prepare fictitious tax returns by hand could be replicated
with simple electronic preparation at a computer. Additionally, researchers
should examine whether brief surveys induce honesty by calling attention to
moral standards in the same manner that signing a form does.
Although lab studies of taxpayer behavior have potential drawbacks,
the upsides make them a valuable tool in this context. Such studies would
____________________________________________________________
197
198

Supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
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allow researchers to isolate specific factors in a controlled environment free
of many complications that actual taxpayers face, such as liquidity problems or other economic factors. 199 For example, researchers who want to
examine the effect of electronic signing versus physical signing can more
carefully equalize the conditions between those that electronically sign,
physically sign, and control subjects who do not sign at all to minimize the
influence of additional factors on the results.
Notwithstanding these benefits, a common critique of laboratory studies of taxpayer behavior is that student subjects do not behave in the same
manner that an adult taxpayer would, and that subjects may generally behave differently in a lab.200 For example, it’s possible that subjects are more
compliant in laboratory tests of tax compliance because they feel more
closely monitored, or because they want to please the researchers conducting the study. 201 Evidence shows, however, that the behavior of student subjects does not deviate significantly from that of adults. 202 Additionally, results of lab studies of tax compliance have generally been found to be consistent with IRS data on actual taxpayer behavior, 203 indicating that there is
not significant deviation from real world behavior when testing tax compliance in a laboratory setting.
2. Pilot Programs
Lab studies of various methods of inducing honesty are only the first
step in successfully implementing policies designed to increase the psychic
cost of tax evasion. Even in light of evidence that laboratory studies of taxpayer behavior are consistent with real world behavior, care should be taken
to determine whether the results of honesty studies are relevant to actual
taxpayers operating outside of a controlled setting. Thus, the next step
should be government testing through small-scale pilot programs, where
specific policies are implemented among test groups in randomized controlled trials. 204 Such trials could be conducted by the IRS at the national
____________________________________________________________
199

See, e.g., James Alm, Testing Behavioral Public Economic Theories in the Laboratory, 63
NAT’L TAX J. 635, 641 (2010).
200
See id. at 641–42. However, not all lab studies involve student subjects.
201
See id. at 642.
202
Id.
203
Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 5, 136–39 (noting that the results of lab studies showing
higher tax compliance among taxpayers claiming refunds is consistent with results of studies of
IRS audit data on actual taxpayers).
204
Scholars argue that any behavioral interventions should be tested first through pilot programs “given the complexity of conditions, the high uncertainty, and in particular given the incredible [potential] cost of implementing policy.” Amir et al., supra note 134, at 451. They also
note that pilot testing is particularly appropriate for tax reform, given the potential revenue
gain/loss at stake: “How is it that the government cuts taxes by billions of dollars without any pilot
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level, or even at state or local levels. For example, the IRS (or an analogous
local taxing authority) might identify 3000 individuals who self-prepare
their tax returns electronically. Of those individuals, half (1500) might be
exposed to the current method of electronically signing their return after it
has been completed, while the other half might be asked to electronically
sign or verify an accuracy statement before proceeding to fill out the electronic form. The results could be analyzed by determining whether there
was an overall increase in reported income (compared to the prior year)
among those who signed before as compared to those who signed after they
completed the form. Like the Schwartz and Orleans study on the effect of
personal norms on taxpayer compliance, 205 taxpayer confidentiality could
be maintained by reporting results on a group-wide, rather than individual,
basis.
Implementing honesty-inducing policies through small pilot programs
would allow policymakers to experiment with a variety of different techniques to determine what works and what does not without expending the
resources necessary to implement a full-scale change. Additionally, some
measures like simply changing the placement of a signature line on an electronic or paper form would not require much additional cost no matter what
the size of the study. Due to their advantages, randomized controlled trials
have been successfully implemented to determine effective policies in other
fields such as criminal law, 206 health care, 207 and welfare policy. 208
3. Similar Approaches in Other Countries
The United Kingdom has already begun implementing honesty-inducing
policies on a small scale in an effort to decrease fraud and error in the tax
system and in other areas. The government’s “Behavioural Insights Team,”
a special coalition designed to apply findings from behavioral economics
test? Why not give the residents of Rhode Island (just as an example) one of four levels of tax cuts
for a year or two and see the effect? Wouldn’t this be much more efficient and beneficial in the
long run?” Id.
205
Supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
206
See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidenced-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing,
and Tracking, 42 CRIME & JUST. 377, 409 (2013) (noting that randomized trials of juvenile offenders showed that prosecuting after arrest led to more repeat offenses than those who were “diverted or cautioned”).
207
Global HIV Prevention Working Group, HIV/AIDS and the Global Community: Global
Mobilization for HIV Prevention: A Blueprint for Action, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 297, 315 n.42
(2002) (discussing randomized trials showing efficacy of safe sex programs in preventing HIV).
208
Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy, Social Programs That Work: Minnesota Family Investment Program, http://evidencebasedprograms.org/1366-2/minnesota-family-investment-program,
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research to public policy, published a report in 2012 describing the results
of some of these studies. 209 One trial was undertaken to gauge the effect of
“signing at the top” of forms, based on the empirical research described in
Part II above, including the auto insurance study. 210 This trial, conducted by
the Behavioural Insights Team in partnership with the Manchester City
Council, examined the claiming of Single Person Discounts, which entitle
people living alone to a twenty-five percent discount on their local council
tax. 211 The government has estimated that UK-wide losses due to individuals falsely claiming a Single Person Discount are potentially as high as £100
million. 212
In 2011, the Manchester City Council sent approximately 38,000 letters to residents who had claimed a Single Person discount the previous
year. The letter requested that residents complete a form on the reverse side
to claim the Single Person Discount if they were still living alone. 213 Some
residents received the original letter that had been sent in previous years,
while others received a new letter with a required signature at the top of the
form. 214 The new letter resulted in a six percent reduction in requests to renew the Single Person Discount as compared to the original letter,215 saving
the city council an estimated £240,000216 in one year for an essentially costless change.
Additionally, a coalition similar to the Behavioural Insights Team
called the “INudgeYou Team” in Denmark has worked with the Danish
Ministry of Taxation to incorporate the findings of behavioral economics
into policies that will improve tax compliance. One intervention sought to
address difficulties that the Ministry of Taxation was having collecting tax
from young people ages fifteen to twenty-five. 217 After interviewing a number of young taxpayers, and studying the online behavior of youth on websites such as Facebook, the INudgeYou Team found that redesigning the
____________________________________________________________
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Ministry’s website to make it more relatable and familiar was key to encouraging better tax compliance among young people. The changes were
described as “an adaptation of a visual universe that the target group knew
and understood from the online world they were familiar with.”218 As was
the case with the behavioral interventions in the UK, the INudgeYou Team’s
policies produced a measureable increase in tax compliance among Denmark’s youth. 219
C. Addressing Potential Objections
Incorporating the findings of behavioral economics into government
policies is not without controversy. Critics have argued that such policies
lack robust empirical support, lack a solid theoretical underpinning, and are
unduly paternalistic. Critics may also argue that increasing the psychic cost
of tax evasion imposes collateral costs on the tax system that outweigh its
benefits. This Section addresses some of those concerns.
1. Honesty-Inducing Policies Lack Sufficient Empirical Support
A primary criticism of behavioral law and economics is that the results
of laboratory experiments often lack real world relevance. 220 The behavioral
nudges proposed in this Article are susceptible to this argument that such
policies simply will not work in the real world. For example, one oft-cited
failed tax policy based on behavioral economics was the implementation of
the Making Work Pay Credit, which was a fiscal stimulus intended to jump
start a faltering economy by distributing up to $400 to qualifying individuals ($800 for married couples) in 2009 and 2010. 221 Whereas previous, similar stimuli had been distributed as a lump sum check, the Making Work Pay
Credit was administered incrementally through the tax system, by decreasing the amount of tax withheld in each paycheck that the individual received. 222 The change was based on a theory put forth by behavioral economists that individuals would be more likely to spend, and less likely to
save, the extra income if they received it in small increments over time, ra____________________________________________________________
218
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ther than as a lump sum. 223 A subsequent survey of recipients showed that
the change in distribution of the credit was unlikely to achieve the intended
result, with only thirteen percent of households reporting that they intended
to spend the stimulus money in 2009, compared to twenty-five percent who
reported spending a 2008 lump sum rebate check. 224 Apparently the incremental distributions for the Making Work Pay Credit were so small that
many individuals reported that they did not even notice the extra income
and, thus, did not make plans to spend it. 225 Many commentators thus
viewed the program as a failure and waste of government spending. 226
Similarly, critics could argue that attempting to translate the results of
the honesty studies discussed above into policy would be a waste of government resources. The previous Subsection addresses the argument that the
empirical studies showing that honesty can be influenced through external
factors lack real world application. There is at least some evidence that lab
studies of taxpayer behavior are reliable indicators of actual taxpayer behavior, 227 and, more importantly, policies can and should be first tested
through pilot programs to determine their external validity. Such trials
would not impose onerous administrative costs due to their small size, and
many of the proposed interventions would be so minor (e.g., moving a signature line) that they would require minimal costs in any event. A similar
pilot program approach could have potentially saved substantial costs in the
____________________________________________________________
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case of the Making Work Pay Credit. Some policies inevitably will not
work as intended, and pilot testing before they are implemented on a wide
scale will prevent the government from wasting precious resources.
2. Honesty-Inducing Policies Lack Sufficient Theoretical Support
Another major criticism of behavioral law and economics is that there
is no coherent underlying theoretical model on which to base behavioral
policies. 228 Whereas neoclassical economics starts from the premise of a
rational actor who behaves predictably, the argument here is that behavioral
economics results in a number of different models explaining various
anomalies in individual behavior without one, unifying theory. 229
The proposals herein are potentially susceptible to the critique that
they lack comprehensive theoretical support. Recall that Part III modifies
the standard deterrence model of tax evasion by incorporating a psychic
cost of tax evasion, Z. This updated model incorporates empirical evidence
showing that individuals are deterred from cheating not only by monetary
costs, but by psychological costs, as well. However, this updated model is
not—nor does it claim to be—a comprehensive model of an individual’s
decision-making process in the context of tax compliance. Just as the neoclassical model does not (nor does it intend to) incorporate non-rational aspects of human behavior, an updated model reflecting the psychic cost of
tax evasion inevitably omits a number of other facets of decision-making in
the tax compliance context, such as the effect of social norms. Further, as
discussed above, it is likely impossible to model the psychic cost of tax evasion with any degree of precision because individual thresholds for psychic
cost likely vary from person-to-person. Additionally, the factors discussed
in this Article—attention to moral standards, categorization, and the presence of a victim—are no doubt just a few of a multitude of factors that influence the psychic cost of evasion.
But the lack of a comprehensive and unified behavioral model of tax
evasion does not detract from the merit of implementing cost-effective tax
policies that induce honesty. Although one behavioral theory or model will
not fit all individuals,230 adopting policies based on solid empirical evidence
may still alter the behavior of a significant number of individuals. If the
marginal cost of implementing such policies is exceeded by the marginal
gains resulting from improved tax compliance, then policymakers should be
____________________________________________________________
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able to raise tax revenue efficiently. 231 Additionally, concerns that the lack
of a unified theoretical model leads to bad policies in practice 232 can be reduced by first pilot-testing those policies in real world settings to determine
their impact.
3. Raising the Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion Could Impose Unintended
Costs
Critics might also argue that, even if the empirical and theoretical support for raising the psychic cost of tax evasion is sound, such policies could
impose unintended costs that would outweigh their benefits. As discussed
above, many of the policies proposed in this Article should impose only
minor administrative costs on the government and, because the goal would
be to collect additional tax revenue through enhanced tax compliance, this
additional revenue effectively should pay for these policies. But, even if the
administrative costs to the government of implementing such policies were
outweighed by additional tax revenue, there could be additional, collateral
costs imposed on the tax system. For example, honesty-inducing policies
could lead to lower compliance among some taxpayers over time if they
created backlash.233 Taxpayers might resent government efforts to nudge
behavior or feel that the government’s resort to such tactics lessens its credibility. Such policies might also encourage lower compliance if taxpayers
believe adoption of the policies signals that the IRS’s current deterrence
efforts are ineffective. Additionally, such policies could create complexities
in tax return preparation that raise compliance costs for taxpayers.
____________________________________________________________
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All policies designed to deter tax evasion carry some risk of taxpayer
resentment and backlash. 234 For example, research shows that when tax
penalties are set too high, taxpayers may be less likely to comply with their
tax obligations. 235 Yet, there is no reason that the honesty-inducing policies
proposed in this Article would carry a greater risk of creating taxpayer
backlash than current policies designed to increase tax compliance like tax
penalties and audits. 236 In fact, the honesty-inducing policies, by their very
nature, are designed to be subtle nudges that increase voluntary compliance
among taxpayers and, as such, they should carry a lower risk of crowding
out voluntary compliance than policies designed to punish.237 For example,
many taxpayers might not even notice that their signature is required before
filling out their tax return instead of after. For potentially controversial policies that aim to create a salient victim of tax evasion by highlighting items
of government spending (e.g., spending on healthcare), policymakers
should first experiment with various messages to determine which minimize
taxpayer resentment.
There is also no reason that honesty-inducing policies should create
significant complexity or administrative costs for taxpayers. Requiring signatures where they weren’t previously required (e.g., with estimated tax
payments), requiring taxpayers to read brief statements, or requiring taxpayers to take brief surveys will add only minimal time to tax preparation.
Nothing will change in the overall design of tax returns that would add significant additional complexity or costs to tax compliance, nor will any substantive tax laws change.
In all events, the costs of imposing policies designed to increase the
psychic cost of tax evasion would certainly have to be weighed against the
benefits. And, the lack of a comprehensive theoretical model of tax compliance makes it difficult to quantify these costs. But we lack a comprehensive
model of the costs of our tax policies regardless of whether we incorporate
behavioral interventions. The social costs of policies like tax audits or tax
penalties are also hard to quantify, and it is possible that these policies also
____________________________________________________________
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create lower compliance among some taxpayers 238 or increased complexity
in the tax system. There is no reason, then, to favor current policies with
unknown costs over newer policies with unknown costs if it turns out there
is good empirical support for the latter. Although tax policymakers must
strive for an educated understanding of potential costs of new policies, we
should not shut out innovations that could raise much needed tax revenue
because we cannot quantify the potential costs with precision.
4. Behavioral Interventions Are Unduly Paternalistic
Critics of applying behavioral economics to government policies have
also argued that these types of interventions are overly paternalistic and
falsely assume that regulators understand individuals’ true preferences. 239
For example, another recent behavioral intervention was the “Save More
Tomorrow” program, which allowed employers to change the default for
employer-sponsored savings plans to automatic enrollment, so that individuals would have to affirmatively opt out of the plans, instead of having to
opt in. 240 The idea, which was pioneered by behavioral economists, is that
individuals exhibit a “status quo bias” that causes them to adhere to the status quo even if it does not represent their true preferences.241 By changing
the status quo to enrollment in savings plans, policymakers have succeeded
in raising the rate of savings when the program has been adopted.242 Critics,
however, have argued that these changes do not necessary represent individuals’ “true” preferences, but instead merely substitute regulators’ preferences for those of individuals. 243 Such policies, the critics argue, are not
only prone to error in judging individual preferences, but rest on a slippery
slope that could lead to continued, over-intrusive regulation.244
It is not necessary for purposes of this Article to resolve the debate
over regulations that aim to correct cognitive errors that purportedly cause
people to deviate from their true preferences. Enrollment in savings plans,
like other areas that have been traditionally subject to behavioral interventions, 245 represents behavior that is truly optional. Thus, a colorable argu____________________________________________________________
238

See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Alm, supra note 199, at 638; Galle, supra note 231, at 855; Wright & Ginsburg,
supra note 220, at 1059–61.
240
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 112–15; Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo
Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112
J. POL. ECON. S164, S166–69 (2004).
241
Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 240, at S168.
242
Id. at S169.
243
Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 220, at 1056–57.
244
Id. at 1075–80.
245
Other areas include consumer finance protections and “sin” taxes on consumption items
like cigarettes. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 220, at 1052–53, 1057.
239

2015]

The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion

669

ment could be made that individual liberty may be at stake when regulators
interfere with such behavior. 246 And such interventions require policy decisions to be made ahead of time (e.g., that enrollment in savings plans is
good and we want to encourage it) about which there may not be a consensus.
This Article, however, advocates behavioral interventions to encourage
individuals to comply with their tax liability. Individuals are not at liberty to
evade taxes from a legal perspective (though they may do so anyway), and
thus there is no freedom of choice interest to be protected in this context.247
Even if it is rational for individuals to evade tax from an economic perspective, we have already made a policy decision—evidenced by our substantive
tax laws and procedural mechanisms like audits and penalties—that paying
taxes is not voluntary. Thus, applying behavioral economics in this context,
by incorporating honesty-inducing policies to encourage higher tax compliance, should not raise concerns of paternalism.
CONCLUSION
The tax gap presents the government with a formidable task. We are
losing hundreds of billions of dollars of tax revenue each year due to relatively minor amounts of tax evasion by a significant number of taxpayers.
In the aggregate, these sums are quite costly, but enforcement on the individual level is often not cost-effective. Auditing more individuals is likely
unrealistic given budgetary limitations and would be politically unpopular
even in better economic times. Raising tax penalties faces similar limitations. Without ramping up efforts in these traditional deterrence-driven areas, what can the government do to reign in tax evasion?
There is no time like the present for the IRS to innovate. Not only are
we in need of additional tax revenue, but the past several decades have seen
important contributions by psychologists and behavioral economists to our
understanding of what drives individuals to be dishonest. Importantly, there
is much data indicating that honesty is not a fixed trait within an individual
but, rather, can be influenced by external factors. The IRS can and should
use this knowledge to increase tax compliance by raising the psychic cost of
tax evasion.
There is, of course, no guarantee that honesty-inducing policies like
signing a form at the top instead of the bottom can be translated into effective policies for actual taxpayers. But many of those policies could be implemented at such a low administrative cost to the government, particularly
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compared to raising audit rates or penalties, that it is certainly worth investigating their potential. Using some of the behavioral nudges proposed in
this Article, the IRS could pilot test the efficacy of raising the psychic cost
of tax evasion and determine the best manner to do so before implementing
any changes on broad scale. Even minor changes, such as making small
adjustments to the way that taxpayers fill out their tax form, could generate
much needed tax revenue at virtually no administrative cost to the government.

